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DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN
JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
DAVID

S.

RUDSTEIN*

The 1960's was a decade m which the United States Supreme Court,
under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, created a revolution
m the field of criminal justice. During that period the Court vastly
expanded the rights of individuals accused of committing crimes. 1
Although most of the decisions affected only adults, the Court did not
ignore the rights of juveniles. In Kent v. United States,2 decided m 1966,
the Court held that due process of law required that the DistriCt of
Columbia Juvenile Court Act provision for waiver of the juvenile court's
exclusive jurisdiction in favor of the regular criminal courts3 be'inter*BA, University of Illinois; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law Member,
Illinois Bar.
1. The Court expanded the rights of an accused in two ways. First, on a case-by-case
basis it held most of the major provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 US. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment-right to a jury trial); Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (sixth amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right to confrontation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right
to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth
amendment exclusionary rule).
Second, the Court liberally construed those provisions of the Bill of Rights, as well
as other provisions of the Constitution, to maximize their impact on the rights of an
accused. See, e.g., ChLmel v. California, 395 U.. 752 (1969) (scope of a search incident
to an arrest is limited to the suspect's person and the area from which he might obtain
either a weapon or something that could be used as evidence against him); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (sixth amendment right to confrontation combined
with sixth amendment right to counsel requires that an accused have the right to counsel at a pretrial identification confrontation); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination combined with sixth amendment
right to counsel requires police to warn an accused prior to rn-custody interrogation
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him,
that he has the right to counsel, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed by the state to represent him); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection requires the state to appoint
counsel to represent an indigent defendant in an appeal which is taken as a matter of
right).
2. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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preted to provide for a full hearing 4 at which the juvenile is entitled
to be represented by counsel 5 And in the following year, the Court
decided the landmark case of In re Gault," in which it held that at a
hearing conducted to determine whether a child is delinquent, the
child is entitled to certain constitutional rights. The Court specifically held that: (1) prior to the hearing the child and his parents must
be given timely written notice of the hearing and of the specific facts
upon which the petition alleging delinquency is based; 7 (2) a juvenile
has the right to be represented by counsel at a delinquency hearing, and
both he and ins parents must be notified of that right and also of the
fact that if they cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed to
represent the child;8 (3) the fifth amendment privilege against self-mcrimnation9 applies at delinquency hearings; 10 and (4) absent a valid
confession, a juvenile has the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him.1 The Gault opinion also contained broad language
3. D.C. CODE §11-914 (1961). At the time of the Supreme Court's decision the section
had been renumbered D.C. CODE §11-1553 (Supp. IV 1965). The provision has since
been amended to state explicitly the rights held applicable by the Court in Kent. See
D.C. CODE §16-2307 (Supp. V 1972).
4. The Curt held that at the waiver hearing the child's counsel is entitled to access
to the social records and probation reports which are considered by the judge and to
a statement of reasons for the juvenile court's decision to waive jurisdiction. 388 US.
at 557
5. Kent was not the first case involving a juvenile decided by the Warren Court. In
Gallegos v. COlorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), the Court held that on the facts of the
particular case it was a violation of due process of law to admit into evidence the
confession of a 14-year-old boy on trial for murder. The COurt relied heavily on Haley
v. Ohio, 332 US. 596 (1948), in which a 15-year-old boy's confession was found to
have been obtained in violation of due process. In both cases the age of the child was
the primary factor leading to reversal of the conviction, but in neither case were the
constitutional rights of a child m a 7uvenile court in issue.
6. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
7. Id. at 33-34.
8. Id. at 41.
9. U.S. CNsr, amend. V provides: "No person
shall be compelled in any
"
criminal case to be a witness against himself
10. 387 U.S. at 55-57
11. Id. The appellants in Gault also raised the questions whether a juvenile has the
right to appeal an adjudication of delinquency, whether the state is required to provide
a transcript of the hearing, and whether the juvenile court judge must state the reasois
for his decision, but the Court declined to decide those issues because of the other
grounds for reversal. The Court did note, however, that it had never held that a state
is required by the Constitution to provide a right to appellate review in criminal cases.
On the other hand, the opimon strongly indicated that both a record of the hearing
and a statement of reasons for the judge's decision were required. 387 US. at 57-58.
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which indicated that many of the other constitutional rights guaranteed
adults in criminal cases would be granted to juveniles in delinquency
proceedings. 2 Indeed, the case has been so interpreted by most commentators.: 3 Mr. Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, argued that all
of the constitutional rights applicable in state criminal cases were re4
quired in delinquency proceedings.'
Gault, however, was the last case concerning the rights of juveniles
decided by the Warren Court.' 5 Prior to the 1969-70 term of the
12. The general tenor of the opinion indicated that the Court was concerned with
more than just the specific constitutional rights involved n the case before it. The
Court began its analysis of the juvenile court process by stating that "neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." 387 U.S. at 13. Then,
after discussing the theory underlying the juvenile court system, the Court stated:
The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has
not always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures
from established pimciples of due process have frequently resulted not in
enlightened procedures, but in arbitrariness.
387 U.S. at 18-19.
It concluded its general analysis by quoting with approval its statement in Kent:
We do not mean to indicate that the hearing to be'held must conform with
all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment.
387 U.S. at 30.
13. See, e.g., George, Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings: The Due Process Model, 40
U. COLO. L. REv. 315 (1968); Milton, Post-Gault: A New Prospectus for the Juvenile
Court, 16 N.Y.L.F 57 (1970); Case Note, 19 CASE W REs. L. REv. 394 (1968); Note, The
Constitution and Juvenile Delinquents, 32 MoNT. L. REv. 307 (1971); Comment, In re
Gault and the Persisting Questions of Procedural Due Process and Legal Ethics mn
Juvenile Courts, 47 Nu. L. REv. 558 (1968); Comment, Beyond Gault and Whittimgton
-The Best of Both Worlds?, 22 U. MiAMI L. REv. 906 (1968).
14. 387 U.S. at 61. Two other justices apparently agree with Mr. Justice Black's
conclusion in Gault. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), Mr. Justice
Douglas, in a dissenting opinion mnwhich Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Marshall
joined, stated:
[Wihere a State uses its juvenile court proceedings to prosecute a juvenile
for a crimnal act and order "confinement" until the child reaches 21 years
of age or when the child at the threshold of the proceedings faces that
prospect, then he is entitled to the same procedural protection as an adult.
403 U.S. at 559.
15. Subsequent to its decision in Gault the Court agreed to hear In re Whittington,
13 Ohio App. 2d 11, 233 N.E.2d 333, cert. granted, 389 US. 819 (1967), which raised
the issues whether a child who is alleged to be delinquent is entitled to a jury trial,
whether the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required
an delinquency proceedings, whether a juvenile has the right to bail pending disposition
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Supreme Court, Warren Burger replaced Earl Warren as Chief Justice.
Under the tutelage of Chief Justice Burger the crmunal law revolution
of the 1960's slowed down considerably "IIn the area of juvenile rights,
however, the Court imtially contmued- in the direction of the Warren
Court. In 1970, in In re Winshzp, 17 the Burger Court held that the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was constitutionally required in delinquency proceedings.' 8 But the Court's expansion of the
rights of juveniles ended in 1971 when, in the compamon cases of
-of his case, and whether the privilege against self-incrimination applies to custodial interrogation of a child by the police. The Court, however, never decided the merits
of -the case. In In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341 (1968), it remanded the case to the
stare courts for reconsideration in light of Gault.
-%16" See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) -(in-custody statements that
satisfy legal standards of trustworthiness, even though excluded by Miranda from the
prosecution's case in chief, may be used to impeach a testifying defendant's credibility);
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971) (Supreme Court's holding in Chnnel
linuting the scope of a search incident to arrest is not retroactive); Williams v. Florida,
399 US. 78 (1970) (twelve-man jury not a constitutional requirement; nonce-of-alibi
statute does not violate fifth amendment privilege against self-mcriminaton).
17. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Winship actually was not thefirst case involving the rights of juveniles heard by the
Court after Chief Justice Burger's appointment. In DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 US. 28
"(1969), which raised the right to jury trial and standard of proof issues previously
raised -in Whittngton, as well as the question of whether the unreviewable discretion
of the prosecutor to proceed in juvenile court rather than in ordinary. criminal proceedings is a denial of due process of law, the Court dismissed the appeal in a per
curiam opimon because it found that the resolution of the issues would not be appropriate in the circumstances of the-case. It declined to decide the jury trial issue because
the delinquency hearing had occurred prior to the effective date of Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held the right to a jury trial applicable to the states, and it
refused to rule on the requisite standard of proof because the appellants counsel had
conceded during oral argument that the evidence had been sufficient to meet the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, it held that since the issue of
prosecutorial discretion had not been raised in the court below, it could not be subject
io review on appeal.
."Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, in separate opinions, dissented from the
decision of the Court. They both felt that Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, should be given
complete retroactive effect, and that the Court should have reached the merits of the
jury trial issue. On the merits, both justices would have held the right to a jury trial
applicable mnjuvenile court proceedings. 396 US. 33-38.
- 18. Until the decision in Winship, most states merely required that a juvenile be
found to have committed the unlawful act charged by a preponderance of the evidence.
See, e.g., NE. Rnv. STAT. §43-206.03(3) (Supp. 1967); N.Y. FAamy CT. Acr §744(b)
(McKinney 1963). Several courts, however, relying heavily on Gault, had foreseen the
Court's decision in Winship and had held the reasonable doubt standard applicable to
delinquency proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 US. 883 (1968); In-re Urbasek, 38 II. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
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MeKeiver v. Pennsylvania and In re Burrus,1 it held that there is no
20
right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings.
With the decision in McKeiver, it has become clear that the Supreme
Court is unwilling to grant juveniles accused of delinquent offenses all
of the constitutional rights accorded adults in criminal trials. The quesnon left open by Gault, Winship, and McKezver is which constitutional
guarantees are required in juvenile delinquency proceedings. This Article will focus on the fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy
and its relationship to delinquency proceedings. More specifically, it will
attempt to determine whether the guarantee against double jeopardy
bars a hearing on a delinquency petition based on acts which already
have been the basis of one delinquency hearing, whether it bars a
criminal prosecution based on the same acts which previously have been
the basis of a delinquency proceeding, and whether it bars waiver of
jurisdiction by the juvenile court to the criminal courts once a hearing
on the merits of a delinquency petition has begun.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE JUVENILE COURTS:

THE

RELEVANT TEST

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
" This guarantee against double jeopardy
in jeopardy of life or limb
"is one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization," 21 and its history
can be traced from Greek and Roman times to the common law of
England and into the jurisprudence of this country 2 It has been held
to encompass several protections. It not only protects against multiple
19. 403 U.s. 528 (1971).
In the interval between its decision in Winship and its decision in McKeiver, the
Court granted certiorari in a case which raised the issue of the voluntariness of a
juvenile's confession to two murders, and which also challenged the constitutionality of
a provision of the New Jersey Juvenile Court Act. The Court, however, With Mr.
Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Douglas voting to reverse, dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. Monks v. New Jersey, 398 U.S. 71 (1970).
20. Since McKeizer and Burrus the Supreme Court has decided only one case invdlvmg the rights of juveniles accused of committing delinquent acts. In V v. City
of New York, 92 S. Ct. 1951 (1972), the Cburt held that its decision in Winshzp requiring
a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in delinquency proceedings is to be given
complete retroactive effect, because serious questions are raised as to the accuracy of
adjudications of delinquency made under the lesser standard of proof.
21. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)
22. See Bartkus v. Illinois, id. at 15.1-55 '(Black, J., dissenting); Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969). See also J:-SIGLREa, DouLE JEOPAaDY 1-37 (1969)
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punishments for the same offense,2 3 but also prohibits reprosecution f-ollowing an acquittal, 2 following a conviction, 25 and, in some circumstpnces, even following a premature termination of a trial..20 Two policy
considerations generally have been stated as the basis for the provision.
One consideration focuses on the inherent injustice of pifishing a man
twice for the same offense,2 7 while the other stresses the dangers of permitting the state to subject a defendant to repeated trials for a single
offense. 28 The latter rationale was perhaps best articulated by Mr. Justice
Black, writing for the Court in Green v. Unted States. 29 He said:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all
its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
.attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling.him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
maybe found guilty 30
The fundamental nature of the guarantee to the Anglo-American system
of justice was recognized fully by the Supreme Court in Benton v.
Maryland,31 when it held the double jeopardy clause applicable to state
criminal -proceedings through the due process clause of the fourteenth
arleridment3 2
23. 'Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
24. United States v Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970); Benton v. Maryland, 395 US. 784
(1969); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184 (1957); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Kepner v. United States,
195 U.S. 100 (1904); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
25. In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
26. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 US.
734 .(1963). For a discussion of the circumstances m which retrial is permitted following
a premature termination of ihe trial see note 78 infra and accompanying text.
27. Ex parte Lange, 85 US. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U S. 711, 728-29 (1969) (Douglas, J, concurring). See also Note, Twvnce in jeopardy,
75 YALEL.J. 262, 267 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Twice in jeopardy].
"28. Bartkus v. Illinols,359 U.S. 121, 154-55 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 1711, 733-34 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1959) (Brennan, J, separate opinion); United States v¢.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). See also Twice m
Jeopardy, supra note 27; at 267, 286-92.
29. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
30. Id. at 187-88.
31. 395 US. 784 (1969).
32. US. CoNsr., amend. XIV provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
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To say that the double jeopardy clause is binding on the states does
not, however, answer the question whether it is also obligatory in
juvenile delinquency proceedings, for, as McKewer v.Pennsylvama3
clearly illustrates, not all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights that are
applicable to state criminal trials are required in delinquency proceedings. In McKezver, the Court held that the sixth amendment right to a
jury trial,3 4 although held applicable to the states in Duncan v. Louusana,s5 is not constitutionally required in juvenile court proceedings.
The plurality opmion s was careful to point out that in Gault the relevant
inquiry was whether the various constitutional rights involved in that
case, most of which had previously been held binding on the states, 37
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
The test for determining whether a particular provision of the Bill of Rights is
"incorporated" into the fourteenth amendment was explained by the Court in Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 US. 145 (1968). The Court stated:
The recent cases
have proceeded upon the valid assumption that state
crimnal processes are not imaginary, and theoretical schemes but actual systems bearing virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that
has been developing contemporaneously in England and in this country.
The question thus is whether given this kind of system a particular pro-cedure is fundamental-whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an
Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.
Id. at 149 n.14.
The Court m Benton applied this test and concluded that the guarantee against double
jeopardy "is clearly 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice.'" 395 US. at 796.
33. 403 US. 528 (1971).
34. US. CoNsr., amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
35. 391 US. 145 (1968).
36. Mr. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion in wich Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart and White joined. Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment because
in his view the sixth amendment right to a jury trial was not binding on the states.
Justice Brennan wrote an opinion in wich he stated that the right to trial by jury is
inapplicable to juvenile proceedings "so long as some other aspect of the process adequately protects the interests that Sixth Amendment jury-trals are intended to serve:'
403 US. at 554 (footnote onutted). After statng that the purpose of the right to a
jury trial is to protect an accused from government oppression and from a biased or
eccentric judge, he found sufficient protection in the fact that Pennsylvania does not
bar admission of the public to juvenile trials. Id. at 554-55. He therefore concurred in
the judgment in McKeiver. However, in the companion case of In re Burrus, he dissented because the North Carolina Juvenile Act either .perrmts or requires the exclusion
of -the public from delinquency proceedings. Justices. Douglas, Black, and Marshall
stated that all of the constitutional rights applicable in state criminal trials are. applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Id. at 559. See note 14 supra.
37. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1957) (right to confrontation and cross-examination); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 3.72 US, 335. (1963) .(right to counsel).
,
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were applicable to juvenile proceedings,"' and that in Winship the
Court conducted a two-step analysis, first determining whether the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required in state
criminal trials, and then whether it was required in delinquency proceedings 9 Thus, in determining whether the juvenile must be afforded
protection against double jeopardy, the mere fact that the provision
is binding on the states is not conclusive. A further analysis, under the
test enunciated in Gault,must be conducted.
In Gault the Supreme Court stated that a hearing to determine delinquency " 'must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment.' 40 In so holding, the Court expressly rejected the notion
that because the state in delinquency proceedings acts in a position of
parenspatriaeand the proceedings are labeled "civil" rather than "crimnal," a juvenile is not entitled to the procedural safeguards of due process. 41 Prior to the Gault decision, the parens patriae rationale often
was used as the basis for decisions denying children various constitutional rights that were accorded adults in criminal trials,42 including the
protection against double jeopardy 43 The courts which followed that
approach reasoned that delinquency proceedings seek to define and ensure the best interests of the child rather than to prosecute or punish
him for illegal conduct.
Under the original theory of the juvenile court system, such reasoning
cannot be faulted. The informal procedures and the lack of constitu38. 403 U.S. at 541.
39. Id.
40. 387 U.S. at 30, citing Kent v. Umted States, 383 US. 541, 562 (1966).
41. Id. at 14-31.
See also Mr. Justice Blackmun's statement in McKeiver that: "Little
is to be
gained by any attempt simplistically to call the juvenile court proceeding either 'civil'
or 'criminal' The Court carefully has avoided this wooden approach." 403 U.S. at 541.
42. See, e.g., Ex Parte Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P 467 (1924) (right to jury trial);
People ex rel. Weber v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955) (right to
counsel); In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952) (right to bail pendmg appeal); Cimque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923) (right to bail, right to
confrontation, right to jury trial); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 NE. 353 (1932),
appeal dismissed, 289 U.S. 709 (1933) (privilege against self-incrimination); Childress v.
'State, 133 Tenn. 121, 179 S.W 643 (1915) (right to grand jury indictment).
43. People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953); In re McDonald,
153 A.2d 651 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959), cert. denied sub nom. Cooper v. District of
Columbia, 363 U.S. 847 (1960); Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958);
In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); In re Smith, 114 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Dom.
Rel. Ct. Kings County 1952); State v. Smith, 75 N.D. 29, 25 N.W.2d 270 (1946); Ex Parte
Martinez, 386 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964) Contra, United States v. Dickerson,
168 F Supp. 899 (D.D.C. 1958), reV'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959>.
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tional safeguards were intended to benefit the child by removing hun
from the rigidities, techmcalities, and harshness of the crmimal court
system. 44' But as-the Court in Kent correctly noted, the expectations of
the original proponents of the juvenile court system have not been fulfilled, and
[t] here is evidence, in fact,
that the child receives the worst
he gets neither the protections accorded to
of both worlds:
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated
adults nor the
45
for children.
-Moreover, he contention that the state is not puishing a youth for his
illegal conduct'when it commits him to a training school was appropriately answered by the Court in Gault:
Ultimately, however, we confront the reality of that portion of
the juvenile court process with which we deal in this case. A boy
is charged.with misconduct.- The boy is committed to an insttution where he may be restramed'of liberty for years. It is of no
constitutional consequence-and of Iimited practical meaning-that
the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial
School. The fact of the matter is that, however eupheimstic the
title, a "ieceiVmg home", or an "industrial school" for juveniles is
an institutidn, df confinement in. v ich- the child is incarcerated
building with
for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes "awhite-washed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours.
" Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and
friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians,
with him for anything
state employees, and "delinquents" confined
4
from waywardness to rape and homicide.
It is apparent from these cases that the rationale which was used prior
to Gault to deny juveniles the benefits of the guarantee against double
jeopardy is no longer viable. Instead, in determining whether the protection does apply in delinquency- proceedings, the courts must decide
47
whether. the protection is necessary to preserve "fundamental fairness.
44. For' a discussion of the origihal theory underlying the juvenile court system m
this country see In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-17
45. 383 U.S. at 556 (footnote omitted).
46. 387 U.S. at 27 '(footnotes omitted).
47. Although the Coizt never expressly, mentioned the term "fundamental fairness"
in Gault, that has been the interpretation givf6i to "the -phrase the Court did use, vii.
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An analysis of the Supreme Court's opimon in Gault shows that the
Court was particularly concerned with four distinct factors in determining whether the constitutional rights involved in that case were essentialto fundamental fairness in the juvenile court system: the underlying basis
of the right; the effect that the right would have on the beneficial aspects
of the juvenile court system; recommendations of various studies and
model acts dealing with the juvenile court system; and the extent to
which the right was already applicable to delinquency proceedings in
the various states, either by statute or court decision. Primary emphasis
was placed on the first two considerations. The Court analyzed the
rights to notice, counsel, and confrontation, and the privilege against
self-incrimination, in terms of the goal each of those rights was intended
to aclueve. It stressed the fact that timely notice is necessary to permit
preparation to meet the state's case.48 It also emphasized that counsel is
necessary to cope with problems of law, to make a skilled inquiry into
the facts, and- to prepare and submit any defense that the child might
have. 49 In its consideration of the applicability of the privilege against
self-incrimination, the Court's major concern was the untrustworthiness
of confessions, especially those made by children. After noting that one
of the purposes of the privilege is to alleviate- pressure on the accused
so that he is not compelled to admit Ins guilt-falsely,-the Court concluded
that granting juveniles the privilege would tend to increase the reliability
of any confessions that are obtained. 50 In its discussion of the right to
confrontation, the Court merely stated that there is no justification for
"due process and fair treatment." In Winship the Court agreed with the statement made
by the dissenters m the state court opimon that.
"[A] person accused of a crime would be at a severe disadvantage, -a disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be
adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same evf-dence as would suffice in a civil case."
397 U.S. at 363 (emphasis supplied).And in-McKewver, Mr. Justice Blackrnun stated: "[T]he applicable due process standard
in juvenile .proceedings, as developed by Gault and Winship, is fundamental fairness."
48. 387 U.S. at'33, citing Report By The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Admimstration of Justice, The Cballenge of Crime m a Free Society (1967)"[hereinafter cited as President's Crime Commission Report].
49. Id. at 36, citing President's Crime Commission Report; CimrmxN's BuREAui, US.
Du'T. oF HEALTa,-EDucATION AND Wu AP , Pu. No. 437, SANDAMiAs OR JUVENIL AND
FAmin y.CouTms (1966 _[hexzemaftei .cited-as. Children's Bureau Report]; National Council
on Crime and Delinquency, STArmim. JmVENnLi CouiT Acrr 1959) [hereinafter cited as
STANDAm JuvEN E Colar Acr.] The Court also relied on the fact ihat more than onethird of the jurisdictions provided some type of right to counsel in juvenile proceedings.
387 US. at 37-38 & n.63.
50. Id. at 44-47, 52-55.
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different rules regarding sworn testimony in juvenile courts and in
adult tribunals.5 1 The Court also noted that granting all of those rights
to juveniles would "not compel the States to abandon or displace any
of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process."5 It felt that the
juvenile court system could continue to process and treat children separately from adults, conduct informal proceedings, avoid classifying delinquents as "criminals," maintain a policy of imposing no civil disabilities on delinquents, and maintain confidentiality of records concerning
police contact and court action.
Similarly, an analysis of the Winship opinion shows that in determinIng whether the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary for fundamental fairness, the Court examined the rationale underlying the standard and the effect that such a standard would have on the
juvenile court process. It concluded that the standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is "a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error"53 and that "[t] he same considerations
that demand extreme caution m factfinding to protect the innocent
adult apply as well to the innocent child."54 The Court also concluded
that the standard would have no effect on the state's policies of avoiding
the stigma of a criminal conviction and the resulting deprivation of civil
rights; maintaining the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings and the
informality, flexibility, and speed of the adjudicatory hearing; mdividualizing treatment for a child who has been declared delinquent, and
maintaining the distinctive procedures employed prior to the adjudicatory hearing "I
Thus, the two factors emphasized in Gault were the only factors
considered in Winship. The plurality opinion in McKezver, however, introduced a new element into the determination of whether a constitutional right is necessary for fundamental fairness in the juvenile court
process-the effect of the right on the factfinding process. This new
factor was obtained from the plurality's interpretation of Gault and
Winship. Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for four members of the Court,
stated:
As [the] standard [of fundamental fairness] was applied in [Gault
and Winship], we have an emphasis on factfinding procedures.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 56, citing Children's Bureau Report, supra note 49.
Id. at 21.
397 U.S. at 363.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 366-67
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The requirements of notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and standard of proof naturally flowed from this emphasis.56
While it is true that Gault and Winship can be interpreted in this
manner, it is submitted that the plurality in McKenver read the two
opinions too narrowly The Supreme Court's emphasis on the effect of
the right on the factfinding process in Gault and Winship must be
taken in the context of the various constitutional rights involved in
those cases. Essentially, the Court was looking at the underlying rationale for each of the constitutional rights and determining whether that
rationale was equally appropriate in juvenile court proceedings and
whether there would be any adverse effects on the substantive benefits
of the juvenile court process. By coincidence, or perhaps because the
Court felt that rights affecting the factfinding process were the most
important and hence should be dealt with first, the Court's examination
of the matter revealed that all of the rights considered by the Court in
Gault and Winship were to some extent based on the need for increased
accuracy in the factfinding process. Nevertheless, there is no reason to
believe that the Court will linut constitutional rights in delinquency
proceedings solely to those rights which have an impact on the factfinding process. It is more likely that it will grant juveniles any constitutional right that will benefit them, so long as the right does not
impair the beneficial aspects of the juvenile court system.
In any event, the plurality in McKeiver considered the effect of the
right to a jury trial on the factfinding process in delinquency proceedings and concluded that it "would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the
factfinding function, and would, contrarily, provide an attrition of the
juvenile court's assumed ability to function in a umque manner." 57
They reasoned that because juries are not required in many other types
of proceedings, including military trials and those for minor criminal
58
offenses, they are not a necessary component of accurate factfinding.
The opinion also noted that various studies and model statutes do not
recommend that the right to a jury trial be made mandatory in juvenile
56. 403 U.S. at 543.
57. Id. at 547.
58. Id. at 543. The Court noted that, in addition to military trials and minor crninal
cases, jury trials are not required in equity cases, in workmen's compensation, in probate,
or m deportation cases. The Court also reasoned that since the right to a jury trial in
state criminal proceedings has not been held retroactive, the integrity of a decision
reached without a jury cannot seriously be questioned. Id.
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cases, 9 that at least 35 jurisdictions, either by statute or court decision,
deny juveniles the right to a jury trial,60 and that the majority of courts
which had decided the issue since the Gault and Duncan decisions had

held that the right to a jury trial is not constitutionally required in delinquency proceedings." Finally, the Court found that the impokition
of the right would have an adverse impact on the juvenile court process

by turning it into a fully adversary proceeding, with the resultant delay
and formality, and by impeding experimentation by states in solving
62
juvenile problems.

Through its opimons in Gault, Winshtp, and McKeiver, the Supreme
Court has provided a framework for analysis of the applicability of the
Bill of Rights to juvenile court proceedings. In applying that analysis

to the guarantee against double jeopardy, it is necessary to conduct a
separate inquiry for each of the three contexts in which double jeopardy

might arise in proceedings involving juveniles, since it is conceivable that
fundamental fairness requires the guarantee in some situations but not
in others.
Two DELINQUENCY PETITIONS BASED ON THE

SAME ACT

The first context in which the question of double jeopardy can arise
juvenile proceedings occurs when a delinquency petition is filed and
the same act has already been the subject of a prior delinquency hearin

ing.

3

Since a finding of delinquency in the first proceeding would

59. Id. at 546, 549-50. The Court examined the 1967 Task Force Report of the President's Crime Commission, Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crrme; the UNiFoam
JuvENIL COURT AcT; the STANDARD JUVENILE COURT Acr; and a publication by the
Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, W SHERIDAN,
LEGISLATIVE

GUIDE FOR DAFinNa

FAMILY AND JUVENILE COURT

AcTs (1969)

[hereinafter

cited As SHEDAN].
60. 403 U.S. at 548-49 & nn.7-9.
61. Id. at 549.
62. Id. at 545, 547
63. Most juvenile court acts provide for three distinct phases in a delinquency proceeding. Unless a, stationhouse adjustment is reached, the child is brought before a
juvenile court judge for a detention hearing. At that hearing the court determines
whether there is probable cause to believe that the child is delinquent. If -the court
finds no probable cause, then it must release the child and dismiss the petition. However, if the court finds probable cause it can either order the child detained at a youth
home or release him pending an adjudicatory hearing. See, e.g, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37,
" 703-6 (Supp. 1972). The second.phase of the proceeding is the adjudicatory hearing,
at which the court hears evidence to deterrnne whether the allegations of the delinquency petition are supported. If the court.finds the child is not delinquent or that
the best interests of the child and the public will ;not be served by adjudging him a ward
of the court, the court must rilease the child aiid dismiss the petition. If the court
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permit the court to commit the child to a state institution .and thus
eliminate the necessity for a second delinquency petition, the typical
case involves a second petition filed after either a dismissal of the first
petition by the juvenile court judge," the declaration of a rmstril in
the first proceeding because of some action chargeable to-the state,"5 or a
finding by the judge that the state did not meet its burden of proof n
attempting to prove that the child committed-the unlawful acts alleged
in the first petitionY6
It is clear that in any of the above-described circumstances the double
jeopardy clause would bar reprosecution of an adult defendant.67 Indeed, those courts which have considered the issue since Gault have been
unanimous in holding that fundamental fairness similarly bars a hearing
juvenile court proceedings.6
on a subsequent delinquency petition infinds the child delinquent and that it is in-the best interests of the juvenile-and the
public that he be made a ward of the court,, the court must so adjudge him and set a
time for a dispositional hearing. See, e.g., IL. REV. STA:T. ch. 37, §§701-4, 704-2, -6, -8
(Supp. 1972). The final phase of the proceeding is the dispc~itional hearing, at which
the juvenile court judge hears evidence to determine what disposition should be made
in respect to the delinquent child. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ci. 37, §701-10, 705-1 _(Supp.
1972).
For purposes of this Article, the terms "adjudicatory hearing" and "delinquency
hearing" will be used interchangeably to refer to the hearing in juvenile court at which
the judge determines whether the child is delinquent.
64. In re McDonald, 153 A.2d 651 (D.C. Mun. Cr.,App. 1959), cert. dened, sub nom.
Cooper v. District of Columbia, 363 U.S. 847 (1960) (petition dismissed because government refused to reveal the name of a governrhent informer); Collins v. State, 429
S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (motion for nonsuit by government granted).
65. Tolliver v. Judges of Family Court, 59 Misc. 2d 104, 298 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Supreme
Ct. Bronx County 1969) (mistrial declared because state's witness did not appear at
hearing); Fonseca v. Judges of Family Court,, 59 Misc. 2d 492, 299 N.Y.S.2d 493
(Supreme Ct. Kings County 1969) (mistrial declared after hearing had begun when
prosecutor stated he was not ready for trial).
66. M. v. Superior Ct. of Shasta County, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752
(1971); In re P.L.V., 490 P.2d 685 (Colo. 171);'In re G.D.K., 491 P.2d 81 (Colo. App.
1971).
67. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734. (1963) (mustrial because of failure of
government's witnesses to appear); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962)
(directed verdict of acquittal because of prosecutor's misconduct and lack of credibility
of government witnesses); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (jury verdict of
not guilty).
68. M. v. Superior Ct. of Shasta County, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr.
752 (1971); In re P.L.V, 490 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1971); In re G.D.K., 491 P.2d 81 (Colo.
App. 1971); Fonseca v. Judges of Family Court, 59 Misc. 2d 492, 299 N.Y.S.2d 493
(Supreme Ct. Kings County 1969); Tolliver v. Judges of Family Court, 59 Misc. 2d 104,
298 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Supreme Ct. Bronx County 1969); Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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The reasoning of these courts, however, has not been very helpful. Most
courts merely have stated that Gault requires that delinquency hearings
be consistent with due process of law and that because the first hearing
could have resulted in incarceration, the guarantee against double jeopardy is applicable. Although the conclusion of these courts seems correct, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gault, Winshtp, and McKezver
indicates that a deeper analysis of the situation is required. In all three
of those cases the Court examined numerous factors before deciding
whether the various constitutional rights involved were required in delinquency proceedings. A similar sort of analysis would seem to be
necessary before reaching the conclusion that fundamental fairness prohibits prosecution of a second delinquency petition based on acts which
have already been the basis of a prior hearing.
The principal factor relied on by the plurality in McKeiver, and interpreted by them as having been emphasized in Gault and Winship,
was the effect that the particular constitutional right would have on the
factfinding process. Although the plurality's interpretation of Gault and
Winship is questionable, even under their analysis the conclusion that
the guarantee against double jeopardy bars a second delinquency proceeding after an initial finding that the child did not commit the alleged
illegal acts is inevitable. In such circumstances, the guarantee against
double jeopardy has a profound impact on the accuracy of the factfinding process. By preventing the prosecutor from retrying the case
until he achieves a finding of delinquency, the guarantee minimizes the
chance that an innocent child will be convicted."' One commentator has
given an excellent illustration of this fact:
[I]f the evidence were such that one in four [factfinders] would
convict, and three in four acquit, the probability of conviction if
the defendant is tried once is, of course, one in four (4/16). If
two trials were permitted the defendant would have to convince
two [factfinders] of his innocence and the probability of one of
the two convicting would be 1 - ( X %) - (7/16); assuming
the independence of each [factfinder] and the absence of other
variables. If he had to convince five [factfinders] his probability
7
of conviction by one would rise to over three in four.
That the guarantee against double jeopardy has an effect on the accuracy of the factfinding process should weigh heavily in favor of its
69. Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 27, at 278.
70. Id. at 278 n.74.
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applicability to delinquency proceedings in the context now being dis-

cussed.
In addition, the protection is fundamental to the very integrity of the
factfinding process. One of the theories underlying the guarantee against
double jeopardy is that the accused need "run the gantlet only once.""'
As Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
It serves the
purpose of precluding the State, following
acquittal, from successfully retrying the defendant in the hope of
securing a conviction. "The vice of thus procedure lies in relitigating the same issue on the same evidence before two different [factfinders] with a man's innocence or guilt at stake" "in the hope that
[the second factfinder] would come to a different conclusion." 72
This same rationale applies in juvenile proceedings. If the judge finds
that the youth did not commit the offense alleged in the first petition,
a second delinquency hearing would merely be an attack on the factfinding process in general. Its only purpose would be the hope that the
judge would reach a different result the second time around, and its
only rationale would be that the first fact-finding process was inaccurate.
But if that reasoning is sound, any subsequent decision in the case would
be open to similar criticism. It is therefore necessary, in order to protect the integrity of a factflnding system which on the whole appears
accurate, to permit the state only one opportumty to convict a defendant
or to have a juvenile declared delinquent and to abide by the decision
of the factfnder. 7' Any other result would be tantamount to a statement that the factfinding process is unreliable and would necessitate a
reexamination of an important theory of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Thus, even if the statement m McKeiver is correct, that the Supreme
Court in juvenile cases has been concerned primarily with the effect of
a constitutional right on the accuracy of the factfinding process, it is
inconceivable that the Court would be less concerned about a constitutional right which affects the very integrity of that same factfinding
process. Therefore, the argument that the guarantee against double
71. North Carolina v. Pearce 395 U.S. 711, 727 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring)
72. Id. at 734-35, quoting from Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (Warren, C.J, dissenung).
73. This analysis, of course, applies only to those situations in which the state fails to
meet its burden of proof after it has had an opportunity to introduce all of-its evidence
at a complete adjudicatory hearing. For an analysis of the situation in vuch the first
delinquency proceeding ends prematurely, see text accompanying notes 78-85 ifna.
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jeopardy has grave impact on the factfinding process also would
support application of the guarantee to juvenile cases in order to bar
second delinquency proceeding on petition based on facts that already
have been the subject of one complete adjudicatory hearing.
The second major factor considered by the Court in deterrmnmg the
applicability of
constitutional right to juvenile proceedings is the
effect the right would have on the juvenile court system's assumed
ability to function in unique manner. An analysis of the consequences
of holding the guarantee against double jeopardy applicable to delinquency proceedings in the present context reveals that would- have
no effect on the substantive benefits ,of the juvenile court system. Three
elements generally have been regarded as the vital features of the juve
nile process: the flexibility for adjustments without an adjudicatory
hearing, the informality of ion-adversary adjudicatory hearing, and
the dispositonal alternatives available to the judge if the child found
delinquent.7 4 The guarantee against double jeopardy would have absolutely no effect on the first delintquency proceeding. The possibility
of stationhouse adjustment would -remain; the adjudicatory hearing
would not be reformulated into 'fully adversary' proceeding, and if
the child were found delinquent tihe same dispositional alternatives
would be available to the judge. In addition, none of the fraditional
delay or clamor of the adversary system would be introduced into the
juvenile proceedings, and the confidentiality of the proceedings would
still be present. The only effect of the double jeopardy protection
would be to prohibit the state from having second chance at an adjudication of delinquency
Other factors that were considered in Gault and in McKezver were
embodied in recommended legislation and in governmental study reports.
These sources also indicatedthat the guarantee against double jeoqpardy
should bar second delinquency proceeding for the same acts. Although
the President's Crine Commission Report, the Uniform J'uvenile Court
Act, and the two Standard Acts did not mention anything about pre
venting second delinquency hearing, the Children's Bureau of he De
partment of Health, Education and Welfare recommended the adoption
of traditional constitutIonal law concepts as to when jeopardy attaches.
The Bureau also recommended that second juvenile proceeding based
on the same conduct be barred, once, the juyenile. court begins,-takmg
-74. McKeiver
Pennsylvania, 403 .U..528,145, 550 (1971)
358, 366 (1970); Inre Gault, 387, U.S. 1;'25 (i9661:'

In re. Winship, 397 US.
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evidence in the first proceeding. 75 And while New Mexico is the only
state that expressly prohibits a second delinquency proceeding, 76 this
fact might be explained on the ground that a second delinquency hearing
is so fundamentally unfair that it was thought unnecessary to include
such a provision. Indeed, an analysis of those court decisions which have
decided the issue since Gault indicates that the courts have felt it obvious
that the double jeopardy protection applies in these situations.77
In any event, the major factors as interpreted by the plurality in
McKeiver-the impact of the right both on the factfinding process and
on the substantive benefits of the juvenile court process-weigh heavily
in favor of holding the guarantee applicable to delinquency proceedings.
Consequently it seems likely that the guarantee against double jeopardy,
at least in the context of a delinquency petition based on the same acts
that had previously been the subject of one complete adjudicatory
hearing, is necessary for fundamental fairness in the juvenile court
system.
The remaining question is whether the guarantee should also apply
-when the first adjudicatory hearing ends prematurely In an ordinary
criminal proceeding, the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit reprosecution of a defendant if a mistrial is declared with the defendant's
consent or because of a "manifest necessity "s78 Conversely, reprosecu75. SHmRmAN, supra note 59, at §27 and comment.
76. N.M. STAT. ANN.§13-14-25 (Supp. 1972).

77. M. v. Superior Ct. of Shasta County, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr.
752 (1971); In re P.L.V, 490 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1971); In re G.D.K., 491 P.2d 81 (Colo.
App. 1971); Fonseca v. Judges of Family Court, 59 Misc. 2d 492, 299 N.Y..2d 493
(Supreme Ct. Kings County 1969); Tolliver v. Judges of Family Court, 59 Misc. 2d
104, 298 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Supreme Ct. Bronx County 1969); Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d
650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
78. The "manifest necessity" test was formulated by Mr. Justice Story in United
States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824), which raised the question whether
the fifth amendment prohibited reprosecution of a defendant following a mistrial declared because of the jury's inability to reach a verdict. He stated:
We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of
justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict,
whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration,
there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would
otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the
subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, wuch would
render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used
with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain
and obvious causes;
But, after all, they have the right to order the
discharge; and the-security which the public have for the faithful, sound,
and conscientious exercise of this discretion, rests, mn this, as in other cases,
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tion generally is barred when premature termination of a trial is caused
by some action chargeable to the state or by an abuse of discretion by
the trial judge. 78 An analysis of the situations in which the problem has
arisen in juvenile court proceedings leads to the conclusion that the
same rules that apply in criminal cases should apply in delinquency proceedings. The premature ending of a delinquency hearing can result
from several causes-a motion for nonsuit by the government,"0 the
failure of the state's main witness to appear at the hearing,8 ' an admission
by the state that it is not ready for trial, 2 or the failure of the government to reveal the name of an reformersa It is clear that in each of the
first three situations the government would be unable to meet its burden
upon the responsibility of the judges, under their oaths of office.
Id. at 579 (emphasis supplied).
Since then, the Perez test has been applied in a variety of instances. See, e.g., Wade
v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (wartime tactical necessity in a court-martial proceeding); Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909) (hung jury); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S.
71 (1902) (hung jury); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (disqualification
of a juror because he had served on the grand jury which indicted the defendant);
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) (hung jury); Simmons v. United States, 142
U.S. 148 (1891) (reprosecution permitted following a mistrial declared because of a
possibility of prejudice on the part of a juror). In addition, the Court held in Gori v.
United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961), that a mistrial declared because of the judge's desire
to protect the defendant from prejudicial evidence did not bar reprosecution, even
though the trial was aborted without the defendant's consent, because the judge was
acting in the sole interest of the defendant. However, this line of reasoning was expressly rejected by the plurality in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), when
it stated:
EWle think that a limitation on the abuse-of-discretion principle based on
an appellate court's assessment of which side benefited from the mistrial
ruling does not adequately satisfy the policies underpinning the double
,jeopardy provision.
Id. at 483.
79. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (reprosecution barred following mistrial declared because of trial judge's fear that government's witnesses had not been
adequately warned of their constitutional rights); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S.
734 (1963) (reprosecution barred following mistrial declared because of failure of
government witnesses to appear at trial); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141
(1962) (reprosecution barred following directed verdict of acquittal during governments case because of supposed improper conduct by the prosecutor and lack of
credibility of government witnesses)
80. Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
81. Tolliver v. Judges of Family Court, 59 Misc. 2d 104, 298 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Supreme
Ct. Bronx County 1969).
82. Fonseca v. Judges of Family Court, 59 Misc. 2d 492, 299 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Supreme
Ct. Kings County 1969).
83. In re McDonald, 153 A.2d 651 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959), cert. devied, sub nom.
Cooper v. District of Colimibia, 363 U.S. 847 (1960).
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of proof if the hearing were permitted to run its course, in which event
it would be barred by the double jeopardy provision from bringing a
second delinquency petition based on the same acts. 4 If that is true,
there is no legitimate reason why the government should be permitted
to avoid that result by prematurely ending the proceeding. Therefore,
in order to prevent the state from circumventing a child's constitutional
protection against double jeopardy, that protection must be extended to
cover those situations in which the state causes the premature ending of
an adjudicatory hearing on grounds which indicate that it would be
unable to meet its burden of proof if the proceeding had continued to
completion.
The fourth situation listed above-premature termination of the
initial proceeding due to a failure of the government to reveal the
name of an informer-must be analyzed differently, since there is no
indication that the state would be unable to meet its burden of proof
if the hearing continued. The result, however, is the same. The government's conduct in that situation has an adverse effect on the factfinding process, since the name of the informer might be essential in
learning the truth."5 Such situations fall within the purview of the
Supreme Court's attempts to increase the accuracy of the factfinding
process in juvenile court proceedings. Therefore, the guarantee against
double jeopardy should also be available to a child whenever the first
adjudicatory hearing is terminated prematurely due to conduct by the
state which would reduce the accuracy of the factfinding process if the
hearing were allowed to continue.
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOLLOWING AN ADJUDICATION OF
DELINQUENCY AND COMMITMENT TO A STATE INSTITUTION

The second context in which the guarantee against double jeopardy is
relevant to juvenile court proceedings is when the state seeks to prosecute a youth in a criminal action for the same acts which have already
been the subject of an adjudicatory hearing in the juvenile court.86
84. See text accompanying notes 63-77 supra.
85. Roviarov. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)
'86. A review of the 'appellate decisions on this subject reveals no cases in which the
state attempted to prosecute a child after the juvenile court had found that he was
not delinquent. This section therefore focuses only on those cases in which the criminal
prosecution follows an adjudication of delinquency If, however, a criminal prosecution
does follow 'a finding of rion-delinquency, the analysis and result would be identical
to that of the case where a second delinquency petition is filed based on the same
conduct which has already been the subject of one adjudicatory hearing. See text accompanying notes 63-85 supra.
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The decision whether to so prosecute a juvenile is usually based on
either the seriousness of the offense allegedly committed by the child"7
or rmsconduct by him while he is institutionalized."" Many instances of
subsequent criminal prosecution arose under former provisions of the
Texas Juvenile Court Act. 9 Under that statute, the juvenile court was
vested with exclusive jurisdiction over children under the age of 17
years who were accused of violating penal statutes. 90 And since the act
91
contained no provision for waiver of jurisdiction to the criminal courts,
it was impossible to prosecute criminally a child under the age of 17 92
As a result, if a person who was too young to be prosecuted criminally
was suspected of a serious offense, the state would first file a delinquency
petition in the juvenile court alleging either that unlawful act or a less
serious, but still unlawful, contemporaneous act. If the evidence supported the allegations in the petition, the child typically was adjudicated delinquent and committed to a state industrial school. Then,
after the youth reached the age of 17, the state would prosecute him
87. Hultin v. Beto, 396 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968) (murder); Sawyer v. Hauck, 245
F.Supp. 55 (WD. Tex. 1965) (murder); People v. Silverstem, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140,
262 P.2d 656 (1953) (burglary); State v. R.E.F., 251 So. 2d 672 (Fla. App. 1971) (forcible
rape and aggravated assault); In re Smith, 114 N.YS.2d 673 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Kings County
1952) (statutory rape); Commonwealth ex rel. Freeman v. Superintendent of State Correctional Insen, 212 Pa. Super. 422, 242 A.2d 903 (1968) (rape); Garza v. State, 369"
S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963) (murder).
88. Moqum v. State, 216 Md. 524, i40 A.2d 914 (1958) (child ran away from psycluamc institution and eloped); Brooks v. Boles, 151 W Va. 576, 153 S.E.2d 526 (1967)
(child failed to obey rules of industrial school).
89. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338 (1948).
90. Tax. Ray. Crv. STAT. art. 2338-3 (1948) defined a delinquent child as a child over
10 years of age and under 17 years of age (females under 18) who violated a penal
statute of the state. Exclusive jurisdiction over actions governing delinquent children
was granted to the juvenile courts by Tx REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-5 (1948). In addition, TEx. Rev. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-12 (1948) required the criminal courts to transfer
to the juvenile courts any case involving the prosecution of a child under the age of
17 (females under 18).
91. For a discussion of the concept of waiver of jurisdiction, see text accompanying
notes 128-33 infra.
92. The Texas Juvenile Court Act was amended in 1967 to correct this situation.
First, the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile courts was limited to children under the
age of 15; and second, a provision was added permitang the juvenile courts to waive
jurisdiction to the crimnal courts in cases involving children 16 years of age or older.
TEx. Rev. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-5, 2338-12

(1971).

The purpose of the amendatory

-act was "to prevent children from being proceeded against in both the juvenile court and
-district court or criminal district court for offenses committed while of juvenile age."
TarAs Acrs 1967, 60th Leg. ch. 475, 6i. For a more detailed discussion of the history
,of these provisions of the Texas Juvenile Court Act, see Frey, The Evolution of Juvenile
Court jurisdiction & Procedure in Texas, I TEx. TacH. -L. Rev. 209, 262-66 (1970).
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criminally for either the same act-upon which the adjudication of delinquency was based or, if the more serious offense had not been alleged
in the delinquency petition, for the more serious offense. For many
years the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals rejected the contention that
the double jeopardy guarantee barred the subsequent criminal prosecuttonY3 In those cases where crimmal prosecution was for a more serious
offense than that alleged in the delinquency proceeding, the court reasoned that even if the double jeopardy clause were applicable to juvenile
court proceedings, that guarantee did not bar a subsequent prosecution
for a separate and distinct offense, even if committed at the same time as
the offense which constituted the basis for the juvenile court's finding
of delinquency And in those cases where the criminal prosecution was
for the same offense as that alleged in the delinquency proceeding, the
court's reasoning was the same as that generally used to deny application of the double jeopardy protection to juvenile proceedings, that is,
since the proceeding was civil in nature and could not result in conviction or punishment for the crime, no jeopardy arose by virtue of the
proceeding. In. 1963, however, in Garza v. State,94 the courtchanged its
position on the latter point and held that the subsequent prosecution
for the same offense was a denial of due process of law The-court stated:
'To affirm this conviction
would be to hold that, for an'offense committed before he reached the age of 17 years, the offender who has-committed no other offense' against the law may, upon
petition of the district attorney, be adjudged a delinquegt child
and held in custody as such, and without regard to how lie may
respond to the guidance and control afforded under the Juvenile
93. Foster v. State, 400 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (prosecution for murder
following adjudication of delinquency based on'tlieft); Ex PaIte Sawydr,.386 S'W.2d 275
(Tex. Cnm. App. 1964) (prosecution for murder following adjudication of delinquency
based on violation of the penal law of the grade of felony); Martnez v. State, 171 Tex.
Crm. 443, 350 S.W.2d 929 (1961) (prosecution for murder following adjudication of
delinquency based on assault with intent to rob the murder victim); Hultin v. State,.
171 Tex. Crm. 425, 351 S.W.2d 248 (i961) (prosecution for murder following adjudi,cation of delinquency based on the same offense); Perry v. State,. 171 Tex. Crim. 282,.
350 S.W.2d 21 (1961) (prosecution for murder followmg adjudication of delinquency
based on unlawful possession of weapon at nime and place, of ,murder); Dearing v..
State, 151 Tex. Crim. 6, 204 S.W.2d 983 (1947) (prosecution for murder followingadjudication of delinquency based on burglary committed at the same nime as themurder).- See also Johnson y. State, 3 Md. App. 105, 238 A.2d 286 (1907)' (prosecunom
for murder of robbery victum following adjudication of delinquency based on the same:
robbery).

94. 369 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Caim. App. 1963).
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Act, be indicted, tried and convicted for the identical offense after
he reaches the age of 17
[S]uch a conviction violates the principles of fundamental fairness and constitutes a deprivation of due process under the 14th
Amendment. 95
Following the decision in Garza, the federal courts reached the same
conclusion in habeas corpus cases involving several of the same persons
whose claims the Texas courts had previously rejected. 6 Moreover, the
federal courts extended the rationale of the Texas court. In Martinez v.
Beto17 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a subsequent
criminal prosecution was barred even if based on a separate and distinct
offense, so long as the separate offense was committed during the same
criminal transaction as that which resulted in the prior adjudication of
delinquency However, the result reached in Martinez is questionable in
light of the Supreme Court's statement in Hoag v. New Jersey9" that
the state is not always forbidden "to prosecute different offenses at
consecutive trials even though they arise out of the same occurrence."99
Other cases of criminal prosecutions after an adjudication of delinquency have arisen because of misconduct by the delinquent child while
he is institutionalized.'0 0 For example, in Moquin v. State"° ' a 16-yearold boy was found delinquent and committed to an institution on the
basis of a petition alleging that he set fires to houses and committed an
assault. After two months in the institution the youth escaped. The
juvenile court then rescinded the commitment order and waived jurisdiction to the criminal court where the child was tried, convicted, and
sentenced for arson, burglary, and assault with intent to murder. Both
the trial court and the appellate court rejected the child's double jeopardy claim. The appellate court reasoned that the concept of double
jeopardy applied only when the first trial was before a court that had
the power to convict and punish the accused, and since the Maryland
Juvenile Court Act did not contemplate punishment of the child, no
02
jeopardy attached at the delinquency proceeding.
95. Id. at 39.
96. Hultin v. Beto, 396 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968); Sawyer v. Hauck, 245 F Supp. 55
(W.D. Tex. 1965).
97. 398 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1968).
98. 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
99. Id.at 467. See also Ciucci v. linols, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
100. Brooks v. Boles, 151 W Va. 576, 153 S.E.2d 526 (1967); Moquin v. State, 216 Md.
524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958).
101. 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958).
102. Id. at 916.
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The Supreme Court has not decided the double jeopardy issue where
there has been a criminal prosecution based on the same acts which
previously gave rise to a finding of delinquency. However, in Gault it
gave some indication that such a prosecution would be a demal of due
process of law In a footnote to the opimon, the Court implicitly approved the holding of a federal district court declaring the practice
unconstitutional. The Court stated:
The impact of denying fundamental procedural due process to
juveniles involved in "delinquency" charges is dramatized by the
following considerations: .
(4) In some jurisdictions a juvenile
may be subjected to criminal prosecution for the same offense for
which he has served under a juvenile court commitment. However, the Texas procedure to this effect has recently been held
unconstitutional by a federal district court judge, in a habeas cor3
pus action. 10
Since the decision in Gault, three appellate courts have considered the
issue. Two of the cases were decided prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Benton v. Maryland,04 winch held the fifth amendment
guarantee against double jeopardy applicable to the states. In Hultm v.
Beto, 05 a federal habeas corpus action, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, relying heavily on the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals' decision
in Garza, held that it is fundamentally unfair to adjudicate a child
delinquent, deprive him of his liberty, and subsequently try and convict
hin for the identical offense. And in Commonwealth ex rel. Freeman v.

Superintendent of State Correctional Institution,'

where two boys

who had been found delinquent for raping a young girl were transferred
for crimnal prosecution for the same offense one month after their
commitment to an institution on the delinquency charge, the court held
that the juvenile court could not waive jurisdiction to the criminal
courts after an adjudication of delinquency. However, the most recent
decision on the issue concluded that a criminal prosecution for the same
offense could take place after a finding of delinquency and commitment
to a state institution. In State v. R.E.F.,10 7 which was decided after all
103. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 n.26 (1967). It should be remembered that at the
time of the decision in Gault, the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy
was not applicable to the states. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
104. 395 US. 784 (1969).
105. 396 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968).
106. 212 Pa. Super. 422, 242 A.2d 903 (1968).
107. 251 So. 2d 672 (Fla. App. 1971)
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of the relevant Supreme Court cases involving juveniles and also after
the Court's decision in Benton, a. 16-year-old boy charged with forcible
rape and aggravated assault was adjudicated delinquent by a Florida
juvenile court and committed to the ,Division of Youth Services for an
mdefimte period. Eleven days after that judgment was rendered, the boy
was indicted by a grand jury for rape. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to quash the indictment on the ground that the criminal
proceeding would constitute a breach of fundamental fairness and due
process of law The appellate court reversed, holding that it would not
be fundamentally unfair to try the defendant criminally after the adjudication of delinquency
Although the court's decision was-based partly on a peculiarity of a
state statute which ousted jurisdiction from the juvenile court if an indictment was returned charging a capital offense,108 the court's major
concern was the welfare of the commuity as a whole. The court stated
that a balance should be struck between fair treatment of the juvenile
defendant and fair consideration of the juvenile's victims and society's
right to be free from lawless acts; it concluded that. the federal courts
which had considered the issue had -failed to 'consider adequately the
interests of the latter. 1°9 It then held that since the indictment immediately followed the juvenile court adjudication and the defendantwas
promptly taken-into custody by crlmmal'court authorities, there would
be no violation of fundamental 'fairness in prosecuting the child crir-.
rnally 110

The approach taken by the 'court in', R.E.F., while-it might have
popular appeal, seems Inconsistent with--the ,approach .taken. by the
Supreme Court in Gault, WinshJp, afid MeKewer Inthose. cases the
Court only looked at what was fundamentally fair to the, child; ,nowhere
did it indicate that a child, could be stripped of his constitutional rights
through a balancing process."' Applying the Supreme Court's approach
to the problemat hand leads to the coriclusion that fundamental fairness
does require that the guarantee against double jeopardy be available-to
bar a criminal prosecution based on the same acts for which the accused
108. FLA. STAT. §39.02(6)(c)

(197i).

109. Id. at 680.
,
110. id..
111. It is true, of course, that in determung, whether a right is fundamental to the
juvenile court process, the Court has balanced various factors, namely, the importanc of
the right and its impact on the beneficial aspects of the juvenile court system. However,
once the Court concluded that the right ygs :fu~dgamental, it did not then balance that
fact against any interest of the commumty-at-large.t \ ,'
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-has already been adjudicated delinquent and committed to a state institution.
The plurality in McKewer, because of its -interpretation of Gault and
Winslip, applied a test that emphasizes the effect that a constitutional
xight would have on the factfinding process. It is apparent that, in the
context now being discussed, the protection against double jeopardy has
no bearing whatsoever on the accuracy or integrity of the factfinding
process, since the state is not being given a second chance to convict
-after one factfinder has concluded that the child was innocent. Yet this
conclusion does not mean that it would be fair to deny application
of the double jeopardy provision -to juvenile proceedings. A proper
reading of Gault and Winship indicates that the interpretation placed
on those cases by the plurality in McKezver is much too narrow
The Court's real concern in Gault and Winshzp was the applicability of
the underlying rationale of a constitutional right to the juvenile court
-process. If that rationale is equally applicable to delinquency proceedings, and if the right would have no adverse effect on the claimed
-benefits of the juvenile court system, Gault and Winship held that the
right should be obligatory on the juvenile courts. Although the rights
involved in Gault and Winship affected the Court's desire for increased
-accuracy in the factfinding process, there was no indication in either
case that other bases would be held insufficient to support the grant of
-a right considered necessary for fundamental fairness in the juvenile
court system.
One of the underlying rationales of the guarantee against double
jeopardy is the theory that it is inherently unfair to pumsh a man twice
for the same offense. 2 The Supreme Court long ago recognized that
fact when it stated:
Why is it that, having once been tried and found guilty, he can
never be tried again for that offence? Manifestly it is not the
danger or jeopardy of being a second time found guilty It is the
punishment that would legally follow the second conviction which
is the real danger guarded against by the Constitution.i13
A second reason is the feeling that the state should not be allowed to
harass an individual by subjecting him to successive trials for the same
offense. A defendant should be able to consider the matter closed once
112. Ex parte Lange, 85 US. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
113. Id. at 173.
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he has been exposed to the rigors of one trial. He should not be forced
to live in a state of continuing fear that he will "have to marshal the
resources and energies necessary for his defense"" 4 in a second trial
5
for the same offense."
The fundamental nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy can
be seen by the fact that, unlike the right to a jury trial, the protection
has been held applicable to all criminal prosecutions." 6 It is also apparent
that the underlying theories of the guarantee are, in the present context,
equally applicable to proceedings originating in the juvenile courts: a
youth who is punished as a delinquent for acts committed while he is
a child should not be punished a second time in the criminal courts for
the same acts, nor should he be forced to go to the trouble and expense
of defending himself a second time for the same offense.
In addition, granting juveniles the protection against double jeopardy
in the present context would have no adverse effect on the substantive
benefits of the juvenile court system. As previously discussed, the double
jeopardy provision would have no impact on the original proceeding
in the juvenile court. All of the same opportunities for an informal adjustment and a prompt, informal adjudicatory hearing, as well as the
wide range of dispositional alternatives, would still be available to the
juvenile court judge. It is only after the juvenile court has had the opportunity to apply its assumed benefits that the double jeopardy provision would be relevant, and at that point it could not be argued that the
juvenile court system, which by then has fulfilled its function, would
be affected adversely in any manner. In fact, William Sheridan, the
Assistant Director of HEW's Children's Bureau Division of Juvenile
Delinquency Service, has stated in this regard:
[T]he concept of double jeopardy appears to be in conformity
114. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1959) (Brennan, J., separate
opimon).
115. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 733-34 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 187-88 (1957); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
separate opinion). See also J. SIGLER, DouaBr JEoPARDY 39-40 (1969).
116. The fact that the right to a jury trial is not applicable in all criminal prosecutions
and the fact that the applicability of the right to the states was not held retroactive
were major factors, relied upon by the plurality m McKeiver 403 U.S. at 543, 547 In
contrast, the guarantee against double jeopardy has been held applicable in all criminal
prosecutions, and the Supreme Court's decision holding the guarantee applicable to the
states has been given full retroactive effect. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 437 n.j
(1970); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 391 n.2 (1970); Price v. Georgia, 398 US. 323,
330 n.9 (1970).
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with the purposes underlying the juvenile court approach, namely,
protection and rehabilitation of the child, and its application to delinquency proceedings does not7 appear to create problems in the
attainment of these objectives."
The two major factors considered by the Court in Gault and Winship
therefore indicate that the guarantee should be applicable in the present
context. And an examination of the other factors considered by the
Court in Gault and the plurality in McKeiver helps to substantiate that
conclusion. At least 31 states have some sort of statutory provision
which would prevent a criminal prosecution following an adjudication
of delinquency "18 The majority of these statutes provide that no evidence given in a juvenile court proceeding is admissible against the youth
1 9 While this language does not
in any proceeding in any other court.
117. Sheridan, Double Jeopardy and Waiver in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings,
23 Fmn. PROB. 43, 47 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Double Jeopardy and Waiver]. See also
43 MINN. L. Rv. 1253, 1255 (1959).
118. ALASKA STAT. §47.10.080(g) (1971); Amx. STAT. AN. §45-204 (1964); CAL. WE.
& INST'NS CODE §606 (West 1966); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §22-1-9 (Supp. 1967); DEL
CODE. ANN. tit. 10, §982(c) (1953); GA. CODE ANN. §24A-2401(b) (1971); HAwAir REV.
STAT. §571-49 (Supp. 1968); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, §§702-7(3), 702-9(1) (Supp. 1972);
IND. ANN. STAT. §9-3215 (Supp. 1972); IowA CODE ANN. §232.73 (1969); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §208.350 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §70-16(d) (Supp. 1971); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 119, §60 (1969); MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §712A.23 (1968); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §260.211 (1971); MIss. CODE ANN. §7185.09 (Supp. 1971); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§211.271(3) (Supp. 1971); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. §10-611 (Supp. 1971); N.J. REv. STAT.
§2A:4-39 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. §13-14-25(I) (Supp. 1972); N.D. CE r. CODE
§27-20-33(b), 27-20-34(2) (Supp. 1971); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §2151.26(c), 2151.358
11, §261
(Page Supp. 1971); OKrLA. STAT. tit. 10, §1127(a) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
(1965); RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. §14-1-40 (Supp. 1971); S.D. Coni'LED LAWS ANN. §26-8-57
(Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. §§37-233(b), 37-234(c) (Supp. 1971); TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. arts. 2338-1(6)(i), 2338-1(13)(e) (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §55-10-105(3)
(Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §662(e) (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§48.38,
48.39 (1957).
119. ALASKA STAT. §47.10.080(g) (1971); ARK. STAT. ANN. §45-205 (1964); CoLo, REv.
STAT. ANN. §22-1-9 (Supp. 1967); DEL. CODz ANN. tit. 10, §982(c) (1953); GA. CODE
ANN. §24A-2401 (b) (1971); HAwAii .REv. STAT. §571-49 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
§702-9(1) (Supp. 1972); IND. AN. STAT. §9-3215 (Supp. 1972); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§208.350

(1969); MASS ANN. LAtWs ch. 119, §60

(1965); MicH. Col.M. LAws ANN.

§712A.23 (1968); MiNN. STAT. ANN. §260.211 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. §7185.09 (Supp.
1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. §211.271(3) (Supp. 1971); MoNT. REv. CoDEs ANN. §10-611 (Supp.
-1971); NJ. REv. STAT. §2A:4-39 (1952); N.D. CENT. CoDE §27-20-33(b) (Supp. 1971);
10, §1127(a) (1971);
Omio REv. CoDE ANN. §2151.358 (Page Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. tit.
11, §261 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §14-1-40 (Supp. 1971); S.D.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §26-8-57 (Supp 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. §37-233(b) (Supp. 1971);
Trx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1(13)(e) (Supp. 1971); UTAH CoDE ANN. §55-10-105(3)
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expressly prohibit a subsequent criminal prosecution, the limitation on
the use of the evidence seems to make it virtually impossible to obtain
1 20
a conviction in the criminal proceeding.
Provisions in other statutes go further than the mere restriction on the
use of evidence. Several statutes provide that once a petition is filed in
the juvenile court, the child is not thereafter subject to criminal prosecution based on the facts giving rise to the petition unless the juvenile
court waives jurisdiction to the criminal courts in accordance with the
procedure specified in the state juvenile court act.1 2' Since most of these
(Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. AN. tit. 33, §662(e) (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. §48.38
(1957).
Many of these statutes provide exceptions for subsequent proceedings under the
juvenile court act and/or for pre-sentence hearings in the criminal courts.
120. There are few cases interpreting the restriction on the use of evidence introduced
at a juvenile court hearing, which may be some indication that the clear language of the
restriction is observed by most prosecutors. One court, however, has stated that the intent of the limitation is to proscribe the actual testimony taken at the juvenile proceeding, and not to exclude a witness who testified at the juvenile proceeding from testifying
on the same subject matter at a subsequent trial for the same offense. People v. Hammond, 27 Mich. App. 490, 183 N.W.2d 623 (1970). Such an interpretation would give a
juvenile no protection against double jeopardy It should be noted, however, that the
statement by the court in Hammond was dictum. The precise issue before the court was
whether certain evidence introduced at a hearing conducted to determine whether the
juvenile court should waive jurisdiction to the regular criminal courts was admissible
at the criminal trial wuch followed the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction. In
concluding that it was, the court reasoned that if the evidence presented at a waiver
hearing were barred, the waiver proceeding would be meaningless because the prosecutor would no longer have any witnesses or evidence to present at the criminal trial.
183 N.W.2d at 626. Under the circumstances in Hammond, the court's reasomng clearly
is correct, but the case of a criminal trial following a waiver hearing is clearly distinguishable from the case of a criminal prosecution following a full adjudicatory
hearing in the juvenile court. In the former situation the state has not had a hearing on
the merits of the complaint prior to the criminal trial, whereas in the latter situation
it has. If a witness at a waiver hearing were precluded from testifying at the criminal
proceeding conducted after a waiver of jurisdiction, the child could never be subject
to punishment or rehabilitation for his unlawful conduct. On the other hand, if the
hearing in juvenile court went to the merits of the delinquency petition and the child
was institutionalized for his unlawful acts, he would not escape punishment or rehabilitation even if the witnesses who testified against hun at the delinquency proceeding
were barred from testifying at a subsequent crimnal prosecution for the same unlawful
acts. Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Wallace, 346 Mass. 9, 190 N.E.2d 224 (1963), the court
interpreted the Massachusetts Juvenile Court Act in just this manner. If the prior
juvenile proceeding was a full adjudicatory hearing, the unambiguous and comprehensive language of the statute would bar the use at a subsequent criminal trial of any ewdence introduced at the delinquency hearing; however, if the prior juvenile proceeding
was merely a waived hearing, the evidence introduced there would not bar its use at a
subsequent criminal prosecution. Id. at 15-16, 190 N.2d at 228.
121. CAL. WoX.v. & INsr'-s CoDE §606 (West 1966); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 26, §70-16(d)
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statutes permit waiver only prior to or during the adjudicatory hearmg,12 2 the practical effect is to bar a criminal prosecution following an
adjudication of delinquency and commitment to an institution. The
Illinois and New Mexico statutes are perhaps the mcst explicit in providing juveniles protection against double jeopardy Both provide that
the taking of evidence in an adjudicatory hearing is a bar to criminal
prosecution based upon the conduct alleged m the petition. 2 3
The weight to be given these statutes was expressed by Mr. Justice
Blackmun in MeKezver He stated:
The fact thata practice is followed by a large number of states
is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords
with due process, but it is plainly worth consideringin determinmg whether the practice 'offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of -our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.' 124
Even under-this standard, it should not be inconsequential that 31 states
provide a juvenile with some protection -against a subsequent, criminal
prosecution for the same offense for which he was adjudicated delinquent.
In addition to the provisions in these 31 states,.the. Standard Juvenile
Court-Act, the .Standard Family Court Act, and the Uniform Juvenile
Court Act aU contain provisions which would apily the guarantee
against double, jeopardy to juvenile proceedings. All three model acts
would bar a. criminal prosecution based on the same facts which gave
(Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. 513-14-25 (Supp. 1972); ND: C Xr. CODE §27-20-34(2)
(Supp. 1971); Omo REv. CODE ANN.. §2151.26(c) (Page Supp. 071); TEN. CODE ANN.
§37-234(c) (Supp. 1971).; TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1(6) (1) (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT.
"
ANN. §48.39 (1957).
122. MD. ANN, CODE art. 26; §70-16 (a) (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §13-14-27 (Supp.
1972); ND. CENT.-CODE §27-20-34(1) (Supp. 1971); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §215.26(a)
(Page Supp. -1971); TEN. CODE ANN. §37-234(a) (Supp, 1971). In additionj the Iowa

Juvenile Court Act, IowA

CODE

ANN. §232.72 (1969), has'been interpreted to bar a

-runifal prosecution once an adjudicatory hearing iit ihe juvienile court has" begun. See
State- v. Halverson, 192 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1971).
Although CAL. WreaL. & INs' Ns CODE §707 (West Supp. 1972) states that transfer
must occur during an adjudicatory hearing, it has been interpreted to permit transfer

ufter an adjudication- of delinquency. See In re f, 17 Cal. App. 3d 704, 95 Cal. Rptr. 185
(1971).
The Texas and Wisconsin acts-make'no mention of when transfer to the criunal
... "
courts can occur.
123. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37 §702-7(3) (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. 513-14-25- (Supp.
.
,
I
" "
1972).
.....
.
o
,
124. 403 US. at 548.
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rise to the delinquency petition, unless the juvenile court waived jurisdiction to the criminal courts in accordance with the procedure described in the statute, and all three require that the waiver hearing be
held prior to the hearing on the merits of the petition. 25 Similarly, the
Model Rules for Juvenile Courts' 26 and the Children's Bureau publication, Family and Juvenile Court Acts,'27 provide that jeopardy attaches
once the adjudicatory hearing begins. In the past, the Supreme Court
has relied heavily on such model statutes as an indication of what rights
are necessary for fundamental fairness. The fact that there has been
general acceptance by the specialized agencies which formulated these
model acts should weigh in favor of applying double jeopardy protection to delinquency proceedings.
When all of the relevant factors are considered, it seems evident that
the guarantee against double jeopardy should operate to preclude criminal prosecution based on facts which were the basis for a previous
adjudication of delinquency The underlying rationales of the protection
have been deemed so essential that it is applicable to all criminal cases,
and both theories have as much merit in the juvenile court system as they
do in the regular criminal process. In addition, holding the right applicable to juvenile proceedings would have no effect on the substantive
benefits of the juvenile court system. That system would be able to
function in exactly the same manner as it does now The fact that over
three-fifths of the jurisdictions in this country have statutory provisions
which have the effect of barring a subsequent criminal prosecution for
the same offense also indicates that the principle is deeply rooted in the
jurisprudence of this country Although the most recent court to consider the issue concluded that the guarantee is not applicable to delinquency proceedings, the clear trend, even prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Gault, is to bar the subsequent criminal prosecution. Finally,
the fact that the model acts in the field recommend such a provision,
when taken with all of the other factors, leads to the conclusion that the
guarantee against double jeopardy should be held applicable to juvenile
125. UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT Acr §34 (1968). Although §13 of both the Standard
Juvenile Court Act and the Standard Family Court Act is somewhat ambiguous as to
when the waiver hearing must be held, when read in conjunction with Rule 9 of the
Model Rules for Juvenile Courts, which is published by the same agency which formulated both Standard Acts; it is clear ihat those acts require the waiver hearing to precede the hearing on the merits of the delinquency petition. MODEL RUL.S FOR JUVENILE
Couirrs, Rule 9.and Comment (1969).
126. MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS, supra note 125, at Rule 9 and Comment.
127. SHERIDAN, supra note 59, at §27
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court proceedings to bar criminal prosecution of a delinquent child for
the same acts which have already served as the basis for trial and punishment in the juvenile court system.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE DECISION TO WAIVE
JURISDICTION TO THE CRIMINAL COURTS

The final context in which the question of double jeopardy can arise
in proceedings involving juveniles is when the juvenile court waives its

jurisdiction over a child after the start of an adjudicatory hearing and
transfers the case to the regular criminal courts for prosecution. This
context is closely related to the one just discussed, since waiver can
sometimes occur following the commitment of a child to a state institution. This discussion will be limited to a consideration of the situation where a criminal prosecution follows a waiver of jurisdiction after
the start of a hearing on the merits of the delinquency petition, but
before any punishment has been inposed on the child. It should be noted
that if the waiver occurs after commitment of the juvenile to a corrective
institution, the discussion in the previous section applies as wel as the
present analysis.
At least 44 jurisdictions have provisions in their juvenile court statutes
which permit waiver of jurisdiction in cases involving all or a limited
category of offenses.'

28

The purpose of these provisions is to provide

128. A .A. CODE tit. 13, §364 (1958); ALAsKA STAT. §47.10.060 (1971); AmZ. Juv. Cr. R.
.12, 14 (Supp. 1971);, CAL. WELP. & INST'NS CODE §707 (West Supp. 1972); CoLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. §22-1-4(4) (a), 22-3-8(1) (Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §17-60a
(Supp. 1972); D.C. CODE §16-2307 (Supp. V 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. §39.02(6) (Supp.
1972); GA. CODE ANN. §24A-2501 (1971); HAWAI REV. STAT. §571-22 (Supp. 1971); IDAHO
CODE §16-1806 (Supp. 1971); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, §702-7(3) (Supp. 1972); IND. ANN.
STAT. §9-3214 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. §§232.72.73 (1969); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§38.808 (Supp. 1971); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §208.170 (1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. Ut. 15,
§2611(3) (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §70-16 (Supp. 1971); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 119, §§61; 75 (1965); MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §712A.4 (Supp. 1972); MNN. STAT.

ANN. §260.125 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. §7185-15 (1953); Mo. ANN. STAT. §211.071
(1962); MONT. Rev. CODES ANN. §10-603 (Supp. 1971); Nay. Rev. STAT. §62.08 (1969);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §169.21 (1964); N.J. REv. STAT. §2A:4-15 (1952); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §13-14-27 (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §7A-280 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE
§27-20-34 (Supp. 1971); Orno REv. CODE ANN. §2151.26 (Page Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 10, §1112(b) (1971); ORE. REv. STAT. §§419.482, 419.507, 419.533 (1971); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, §260 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §14-1-7 (Supp. 1971); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§15-1281.12 to .13 (1962); S.D. CoMPErD LAWS ANN. §§26-8-22.7, 26-11-4 (Supp.
1971); TENN. CODE ANN. §37-234 (Supp. 1971); TFx. Rev. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1(6)
(Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §55-10-86 Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. §§16.1-176,
-177.1, -178 (Supp. 1971); W VA. CODE ANN. §49-5-14 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §48.18
(Supp. 1972); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §14-115.38 (Supp. 1971).
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flexibility in the handling of certain older adolescents who, because of
their social and emotional development, will not benefit from the programs of the juvenile court which are designed for the treatment and
rehabilitation of children. 29 To achieve this end, most of the statutes
provide that a child above a specified age who is within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court can be transferred to the criminal courts if, after a
full hearing at which the child is represented by counsel, 130 the juvenile
court concludes that such transfer is in the best interests of the child
or the public.131 Many of the statutes additionally require a finding of
129. Double Jeopardy and Waiver, supra note 117, at 44.
130. This was the requirement set forth by the Supreme Court mnKent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See notes 2-4 supra and accompanying text.
131. Eleven of the statutory provisions are to the effect that the juvenile court must
find that it would be in the best interests of both the child and the public before transfer to the criminal courts is allowed. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §17-60a (Supp. 1972); GA.
CoDa ANN. §24A-2501 (1971); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §208.170 (1969); MD. ANN. CoDa
art. 26, §70-16 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §13-14-27 (Supp. 1972); N.D. CENT. CoDE
§27-20-34 (Supp. 1971); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §2151.26 (Page Supp. 1971); ORE. Rxv.
STAT. §419.533 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN. §37-234 (Supp. 1971); WVA. CODE ANN.
§49-5-14 (1966); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §14-115.38 (Supp. 1971). The Georgia, Maryland,
and New Mexico acts have defined the requirements more precisely They direct the
juvenile court to find that the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation
through the facilities available to the juvenile court and that the interests of the community or the safety of the public require that the child be placed under legal restraint
or disciplined.
Ten other states require a finding that either the interests of the child or the interests
of the public would best be served by a waiver of jurisdiction before transfer is pernutted. CLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-4(4) (a), 22-3-8(1) (Supp. 1969); HAWAI REv.
STAT. §571-22 (Supp. 1971); IbAio CoDE §16-1806 (Supp. 1971) (children over 18
withm the jurisdiction of the juvenile court); IowA CODE ANN. §232.72 (1969); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §260.125 (1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. §7A-280 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. §151281.13 (1962); S.D. CoMPiLED LAWS ANN. §26-11-4 (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN.
§55-10-86 (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. §48.78 (Supp. 1972).
Several statutes contain a standard wluch looks solely at the interests of the child.
See Ar. CODE tit. 13, §364 (1958) (transfer permitted if a delinquent child cannot be
made to lead a correct life and cannot properly be disciplined under the juvenile court
act); ALAsKA STAT. §47.10.060 (1971) (transfer permitted if the child is not amenable to
treatment or rehabilitation through the facilities available to the juvenile court); CAL.
WEP'. & INsT'Ns CoDE §707 (West Supp. 1972) (transfer permitted if the child is not
amenable to treatment or rehabilitation through the facilities available to the juvenile
court); D.C. CODE §16-2307 (Supp. V 1972) (transfer required if there are no reasonable
prospects for rehabilitation of the child); Ka. STAT. ANN. §38.808 (Supp. 1971)
(transfer permitted if the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation through
the facilities available to the juvenile court); Mo. ANN STAT. §211.071 (1962) (transfer
permtted if the child is not a proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court
act); VA. CODE ANN. §16.1-177.1 (Supp. 1971) (transfer perrmtted in misdemeanor cases
if the child cannot be adequately controlled or induced to lead a correct life through
measures available to the juvenile court).
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reasonable grounds to believe the child committed the offense alleged in
the delinquency petition. 32 Two statutes go even further and require
an actual finding of delinquency before the juvenile court can transfer
the case.133 But regardless of the precise requirements, if the juvenile
court does transfer the case to the regular criminal courts, the timing of
the transfer in relation to the adjudicatory hearing on the merits of the
delinquency petition may have double jeopardy ramifications.
The juvenile court statutes of 11 states provide that if a waiver hearing
is held, it must occur prior to a hearing on the merits of the delinquency
petition.1 14 Twelve other states apparently permit the juvenile court to
Other statutes contain a standard which looks solely at the interests of the state or
the public. See FLA.STAT. ANm. §39.02 (6) (Supp. 1972); ME.RZv. STAT. ANN. Ut. 15 §2611
(1964); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, §61 (1965); MONT. REV. CoDEs ANN. §10-603
(Supp. 1971); NJ. REv. STAT. §2A:4-15 (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §260 (1965); Tax.
REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1(6) (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANNq. 16.1-176 (Supp. 1971)
(in felony cases the prosecutor may present the case to the grand jury if he deems it
in the public interest).
Several other statutes merely state that transfer, is permitted after "investigaton" or
"full investigation." See IDAHO CODE §16-1806 (Supp. 1971); IND. ANN. STAT. §9-3214
(Supp. 1972); MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §712A.4 (Supp. 1972); Miss. CODE ANN. §7185-15
(1953); N-v. REV. STAT. §62.080 (1969); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. §169.21 (1964); OKLA.
STAT. tit.
10, §1112(b) (1971); R.I. GExr. LAWS ANN. §14-1-7 (Supp. 1971); VA. CoDE
Am. §16.1-176 (Supp. 1971).
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act apparently permits the prosecutor to decide whether
to prosecute the action in the juvenile court or the criminal court. If the juvenile court
judge objects to a criminal prosecution, the matter is decided by the Chief Judge of the
Circuit Court. No standards for this decision are set forth in the statute. See ILL. Rev.
STAT. ch. 37, §702-7(3) (Supp. 1972).
132. ALAsKA STAT. §47.10.060 (1971); CoN. STAT. ANN. §17-60a (Supp. 1972); GA.
CoDE ANN. §24A-2501 (1971); Ky. Rev. STAT. ANN. §208.170 (1969); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §2611 (1964); MoNT.Rev. CoDEs ANN. §10-603 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §7A-280 (1969); N.D. CENT. CoDE §27-20-34 (Supp. 1971); Omo REv. CoDE A .N,
§2151.26 (Page Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. §37-234 (Supp. 1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§14-115.38 (Supp. 1971).
ARiz. Juv. Cr. R. 14 (Supp. 1971) sets forth "probable cause" as the only standard
required for transfer.
Several statutes also require the juvenile court to find that the child is not comrmtabl6
to an institution for the mentally ill or retarded before transfer is allowed. See GA.
CoDE ANN. §24A-2501 (1971); HAvAIt REv. STAT. §571-22 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§13-14-27 (Supp. 1972); N.D. CENT. CoD. §27-20-34 (Supp. 1971); OHIo Rev. CODE ANxr
§2151.26 (Page Supp. 1971); TEm. CODE Amr. §37-234 (Supp. 1971); Wyo. STAT. ANiq.
§14-115.38 (Supp. 1971).
133. ALA. COD Ut. 13, §364 (1958); W VA. CODE ANN. §49-5-14 (1966).
134. D.C. CODE §16-2307 (Supp. V 1972); GA. CODE ANN. §24A-2501 (1971); ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 37, §702-7 (3) (Supp. 1972) (the taking of evidence at an adjudicatory hearing
bars a subsequent criminal prosecution for the conduct alleged in the delinquency peti:
aon); MD.ANN. CODE art. 26, §70.16 (Supp. 1971); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. §169.21 (1964);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §13-14-27 (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §7A-280 (1969); N.D. CENT?
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conduct the two hearings simultaneously Of these 12, six permit transfer
at any time prior to an adjudication of delinquency,135 while six permit
36
the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction after a finding of delinquency
In the remaining 21 states, the juvenile court statutes make no mention
of when transfer to the criminal courts can occur. 37 It should be evident
that a decision to waive jurisdiction made prior to an adjudicatory
hearing raises no double jeopardy problems, since the subsequent crimnal prosecution will be the only hearing on the question of the child's
alleged nisconduct. In such cases the waiver hearing is akin to a prelimmary hearing in the regular criminal court process. No jeopardy
attaches because there is no danger of punishment resulting from that
proceeding. 38 There is no possibility that the child will be found delinquent and committed to a state institution. The only issue before
the court is the proper manner in which to proceed with the complaint.
On the other hand, a waiver of jurisdiction following a decision on the
merits of a delinquency petition, but before punishment, or even following the introduction of some evidence in a hearing on the merits of a
petition, might constitute "jeopardy" and preclude a subsequent criminal
prosecution for the same offense.
CODE §27-20-34 (Supp. 1971); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §2151.26 (Page Supp. 1971); TENN.
CODE ANN. §37-234 (Supp. 1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §14-115.38 (Supp. 1971)
135. ALASKA STAT. §47.10-060 (1971); Aiuz. Juv. CT. R. 12 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §38.808 (Supp. 1971); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §208.170 (1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tat. 15, §2611(3) (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §260 (1965) (as interpreted m Common-

wealth ex rel. Freeman v. Superintendent of State Correctional Inst'n, 212 Pa. Super.
422, 242 A.2d 903 (1968) and In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954)).
136. ALA. CODE tt. 13, §364 (1958) (as interpreted in Seagroves v. State, 279 Ala. 621,
189 So. 2d 137 (1966); CAL. W LF. & INsT'Ns CODE §707 (West Supp. 1972) (as interpreted
in In re J, 17 Cal. App. 3d 704, 95 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1971)); Mo. ANN. STAT. §211.071
(1962) (as interpreted in Carter v. Murphy, 465 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971)); ORE.
REv. STAT. §419.507 (1971); VA. CODE ANN. §16.1-178 (Supp. 1971); WVA. CODE ANN.
§49-5-14 (1966).
137. CoLO REv. STAT. ANN. §§22-1-4(4) (a), 22-3-8 (Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §17-60a (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. §39.02(6) (Supp. 1972); HAwAII REv. STAT.
§571-22 (Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE §16-1806 (Supp. 1971); IzN. ANN. STAT. §9-3214
(Supp. 1972); IowA CODE ANN. §232-72 (1969); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, §61
(1965); MicH. ComP. LAws ANN. §712A.4 (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §260-125
(1971); MISS. CODE ANN. §7185-15 (1953); MoNTr. REv. CODES ANN. §10-603 (Supp. 1971);
NEv. REv. STAT. §62.080 (1969); NJ. REv. STAT. §2A:4-15 (1953); OKLA. STAT. tt. 10,
§1112 (1971); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §14-1-7 (Supp. 1971); S.C. CODE ANN. §15-1281.13
(1962); S.D. CoMPILED LAWS ANN. §26-8-22.7 (Supp. 1971); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art.
2338-1 (6) (b) (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §55-10-86 (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN.
%8.18 (Supp. 1972).
138. In Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1923), the Supreme Court held that jeopardy
does not attach at a preliminary hearing.
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In an ordinary criminal proceeding, jeopardy "attaches" once the
accused is put to trial before the trier of fact. 39 Thus, the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy not only prohibits reprosecutnon for the same offense following either conviction 4 ° or acquittal; 1 I it
also bars reprosecution if the former trial aborted prior to a verdict,
so long as the defendant did not consent to the termination which resulted m the absence of a "manifest necessity" 142 It would therefore
seem to follow that if the guarantee against double jeopardy is applicable
to juvenile proceedings m the context now being discussed, it would
bar a subsequent crimmal prosecution whenever the decision to waive
jurisdiction is made after the juvenile court began hearing evidence on
the merits of the delinquency petition.
The majority of courts which have considered the issue, however,
have concluded that a subsequent criminal prosecution does not violate
the protection against double jeopardy 1 These courts typically have
139. In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury has been impaneled and sworn.
Newman v. United States, 410 F.2d 259, 260 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 868
(1969); United States v. Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612, 614 (ED. Pa. 1971); People v. Fraison,
22 IMI.2d 563, 177 N.E.2d 230 (1961). In a bench trial, jeopardy attaches when the court
has begun to hear evidence. United States v. Lawson, supra at 614. There is a question,
however, whether this occurs when the first witness has been sworn or when the first
witness has been placed on the stand and has begun to testify. Compare People v. Fritz,
140 Cal. App. 2d 618, 295 P.2d 449 (1956) 'with Newman v. United States, supra.
140. In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). The state is, however, permitted to retry a
defendant whose conviction is reversed on appeal. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S.
662 (1896).
141. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962); Grafton v. United States, 206
US. 333 (1907); Kepner v. United States, 195 US. 100 (1904); United States v. Ball, 163
US. 662 (1896).
The bar against retrial is applicable even if the acquittal in the first trial was implicit.
For example, when a defendant charged with first degree murder is convicted of a
lesser included offense, the state is barred from retrying him on the first degree murder
charge, even if the conviction for the lesser offense subsequently is reversed on appeal
by the defendant. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
142. Umted States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 US.
734 (1963). For a discussion of the "manifest necessity" rule, see note 78 supra.
143. United States v. Dickerson, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959); In re J., 17 Cal. App.
3d 704, 95 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1971); People v. McFarland, 17 Cal. App. 3d 807, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 369 (1971); People v. Brown, 13 Cal. App. 3d 876, 91 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1970), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 835 (1971); Carter v. Murphy, 465 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971);
In re Mack, 22 Ohio App. 2d 201, 260 N.E.2d 619 (1970) (dictum); In re Whittngton,
17 Ohio App. 2d 164, 245 N.E.2d 364 (1969).
The California courts reached this conclusion despite the fact that the guarantee
against double jeopardy had previously been held by the state supreme court to bar a
second delinquency proceeding based on the same acts -which had previously been the
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reasoned that the decision to waive jurisdiction is merely a preliminary
proceeding at wich the juvenile court determines which type of proceeding, either juvenile or criminal, will best protect society and rehabilitate the child; thus, until either the juvenile court or the criminal
court reaches a final disposition of the case, only a single jeopardy is involved.144 It is submitted, however, that the result reached by these
courts is wrong, and that an analysis under the approach taken by the
Supreme Court in juvenile cases leads to the conclusion that once a hearing begins on the merits of a delinquency petition, jeopardy attaches and
a subsequent crimnal prosecution is barred by the guarantee against
double jeopardy
Under the Supreme Court's approach in Gault and Winshzp, the main
factors to consider in determining whether a right is necessary for
fundamental fairness in the juvenile court system are whether the rationale underlying the right is equally applicable to delinquency pro ceedings, and if so, whether the right would have any adverse effect
on the beneficial aspects of the juvenile court system. As previously
discussed, the guarantee against double jeopardy is intended to prevent
the state from pumshmg an individual twice for the same offense and
to prevent the state from using the criminal process as a means for
harassing an accused by subjectmg him to successive trials for the same
subject of one delinquency proceeding. See M. v. Superior Ct. of Shasta County, 4 Cal.
3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1971)
Two courts have stated that the guarantee against double jeopardy prohibits waiver
after a finding of delinquency, but these courts did not decide whether jeopardy attaches at the start of an adjudicatory hearing.'In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523
(1954) (dictum); Commonwealth ex rel. Freeman v. Superintendent'of State Correctional Inst'n, 212 Pa. Super. 422, 242 A.2d 903 (1968)
In addition, two courts have interpreted their state's juvenile court act as requiring
a finding of delinquency before the proceeding may-be transferred to the criminal courts;
In neither case did the court indicate that any dbuble jeopardy problems were raised'
by such a procedure. Seagroves v. State, 279 Ala. 621, 189 So. 2d '137 (1966); liz re
Jackson, 21 Ohio St. 2d 215, 257 N.E.2d 74 (1970).
'
On the other hand, rn.State v. Halverson, 192 N.W2d 765' (Iowa 1971), the court
concluded on statutory grounds that transfer is prohibited once a hearing on the merits
of a delinquency petition begins.
144. United States v. Dickerson, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959); In re J., 17 Cal. App;
3d 704, 95 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1971); Carter v. Murphy, 465 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. Cr. App. 1971);
In re Whittington, 17 Ohio App. 2d 164, 245 N.E2d 364- (1969).
One court, in dictum, stated that no jeopardy attaches at an adjudicatory hearing
because the proceedings in juvenile court are civil and not criminal in nature. In re
Mack, 22 Ohio App. 2d 201, 204, 260 N.E2d 619, 621 (1970)-. It is clear, however, from
the Supreme Court's language in Gault, Winshp,, and McKewver, that- such reasoning, is
no longer valid. See note 41 supra and text accompanying notes 40-46 supra
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offense.1 45 In the context of a criminal prosecution following a waiver
of jurisdiction by the juvenile court, the former rationale is applicable
only in those cases where the waiver occurred after the child had been
,committed to a state institution. In that event, the analysis conducted in
the previous section of this Article would apply The latter rationale,
Iiowever, is applicable even if the waiver of jurisdiction occurred before
the child had been punished by the juvenile court. At a hearing on the
merits of a delinquency petition, a child-is in danger of being found
delinquent and committed to a state training school. The child must
therefore marshal the resources and energies necessary for his defense.
During the adjudicatory hearing, he is subject to the fear and anxiety
tlat he will spend the next few years of is life in a state institution.
,Stich burdens are, of course, a necessary part of the juvenile court and
criminal court processes. But in the ordinary criminal justice system,
unless the first trial- ends prematurely with the defendant's consent or
because of a "manifest necessity", or unless a conviction in the first trial
is reversed upon appeal by the defendant,146 the guarantee against double
jeopardy protects an accused from being forced to go through the ordeal
of a trial a second time for the same offense. Certainly there is no legitimate reason to subject a child to greater'ordeal than would be permitted
with respect to an adult defendant. Fundamental fairness would seem to
'dictate that children, like adults, should be free from the burdens of de47
fending themselves twice for the same offense
145. See text accompanying notes 27-30, 112-115, supra.
146. See notes 78 and 140, supra.
-'147. Mention should be made at this point of the practice followed in some states
.of -combining the hearing on -the merits of a delinquency petition with a hearing on
the issue of waiver. Such a practice is not only at odds with the underpinnings of the
guarantee against double jeopardy, but it is also fundamentally unfair for a second
reason. The purposes of the two hearings are quite distinct. In an adjudicatory hearing
the issue is whether the child, committed the acts alleged in the delinquency petition.
In a waiver hearing the issue is whether the interests of the child or the public would
best be served by a proceeding in the juvenile court or a proceeding in the regular
criminal courts. As a result, the evidence may not be the same. But by conducting the
'two hearings simultaneously the child is compelled to defend against two separate issues,
often not knowing until the decision is made which issue is foremost in the judge's
mind. If the child stresses the waiver issue at the expense of the merits of the petition,
he might end up being committed to a state institution as a delinquent because the judge
was more concerned with the question of guilt or innocence. Conversely, if the child
stresses the merits of the petition at the expense of the waiver issue, be rmght wind up
in a criminal court facing the possibility of a long prison sentence because the juvenile
court judge had been more concerned with-the waiver issue. Even if it is possible for
the child to stress both issues equally, he might find himself in the position of having
to introduce certain evidence to meet the state's case on the question of guilt or rnno-
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The Supreme Court also has been concerned with the effect that a
constitutional right would have on the beneficial aspects of the juvenile
court system. One of those beneficial aspects is the waiver hearing itself.
At that hearing the juvenile court can examine the social history of an
allegedly delinquent child and can determine whether the child can be
rehabilitated or treated through the facilities available to the juvenile
court and whether the interests of the community will best be served
by a delinquency proceeding or a criminal prosecution. In light of the
Supreme Court's reluctance to abandon completely the juvenile court
system, it is unlikely that the Court would be willing to eliminate a
procedure which introduces an element of flexibility into the system.
But holding the guarantee against double jeopardy applicable to delinquency proceedings would not require such a harsh result. Eleven
states have adopted procedures which provide juveniles with the protection against double jeopardy while maintaining the prerogative of
the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction if the interests of the child or the
public so require. In these states if a waiver hearing is held, it must take
148
place prior to a hearing on the merits of the delinquency petition.
Thus, it is not necessary to eliminate waiver hearings in order to provide

juveniles with the guarantee against double jeopardy By simply restructuring the order of the proceedings, the juvenile courts can provide
both the double jeopardy protection and the flexibility of a waiver
hearing.
In certain circumstances, however, prohibiting a waiver of jurisdiction after commencement of the adjudicatory hearing might reduce
the flexibility now available to the juvenile courts. In a limited number of cases, evidence that a child cannot be rehabilitated or treated
through the juvenile court system (or that the public interest requires
the child be prosecuted crimially) might not come to light until the
adjudicatory hearing has begun. This can occur even if the juvenile
cence which is unfavorable to him on the waiver issue and which would not have been
brought up in a hearing to consider only the waiver issue. Or, conversely, he might be
forced to introduce evidence which is favorable to him on the waiver issue, but which
is harmful to him on the question of guilt or innocence and which would not have been
introduced at a hearing solely on the merits of the petition. See State v. Halverson, 192
N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1971).
148. D.C. CODE §16-2307 (Supp. V 1972); GA. CODE ANN. §24A-2501 (1971); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 37, §702-7(3) (Supp. 1972); MD. CODE ANN. art. 26, §70.16 (Supp. 1971); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. §169.21 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. §13-14-27 (Supp. 1972); N.C. Gm.
STAT. §7A-280 (1969); N.D. CENr. CODE §27-20-34 (Supp. 1971); OHno REv. CODE ANN.
§2151.26 (Page Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. §37-234 (Supp. 1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§14-115.38 (Supp. 1971).
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court held a waiver hearing prior to the hearing on the merits. Prohibiting a criminal prosecution at this point would mean that some of the
flexibility now contained in the system would be lost. It would -also
seem to negate the purpose of the juvenile court to deal only with those
children who can be aided by its programs. If it appears that the juvenile
cannot be treated through the facilities of the juvenile court, there
would seem to be no reason to continue the proceeding in that court.
But if waiver were not permitted at this point, the only alternatives
would be to continue with the delinquency proceeding or dismiss the
petition and release the child-neither of which would be in the best
interests of the child and the public.
Although this argument against the application of the double jeopardy
provision to the juvenile courts appears superficially meritorious, it
ignores the fact that a complete waiver hearing was held, or could have
been held, prior to the start of the adjudicatory hearing. As the Supreme
Court of Iowa stated inState v. Halverson:149 _
[I] f a county attorney is causing juvenile cases to be investigated
properly
he will know in advance whether he desires to prosecute criminally and he can so move .the court at or before the
outset of the hearing. He has available the investigative facilities
of the probation officer, the law enforcement officers, and the social
services staff. Moreover, if, after hearing the county attorney's
preliminary statement at the outset of a juvenile hearing, the juvenile court believes that transfer may be indicated, it can, sua
sponte, thereupon restrict the hearing to the question of transfer.iao
Far from being harmful to the juvenile court process, the prohibition
of waiver after the taking of evidence at an adjudicatory hearing might
actually be beneficial, because it would force prosecuting authorities to
tighten their procedures and to conduct more thorough social investigations prior to the adjudicatory hearing. In all cases where the prelinmary
investigation indicates that there is a possibility that the best interests of
the child or the public require a criminal prosecution, a waiver hearing
should be held. Borderline cases should be resolved in favor of a waiver
hearing. In this way the juvenile court-can minimize the number 6f cases
in which evidence suggesting transfer is overlooked until the hearing on
the merits. In the vast majority of cases the correct decision on how to
proceed with the delinquency petition will have been made pri6r to the
149. 192 $NW.2d 765 -(Iowa 1971).
150. Id. at 769.
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start of the adjudicatory hearing. It would therefore seem anomalous to
deny all children the guarantee against double jeopardy simply because
of the ineptitude of the state in its preliminary investigation. The potential harm of such a rationale seems clearly to outweigh the social utility
of ensuring that those individuals who mistakenly pass the initial screenIng process can be transferred for criminal prosecution after the adjudicatory hearing has begun.
A second argument has been advanced against the practice of conductmg a waiver hearing prior to the adjudicatory hearing. The California
Court of Appeals has contended that a transfer hearing following an
adjudication of delinquency is beneficial to the child because it prevents
the juvenile court judge from being affected by evidence of the child's
character which is not relevant to the determination of guilt."" While
this result is indeed desirable,152 it should be noted that only two states
require that any transfer hearing be conducted after a finding of delinquency 11a Even in California the juvenile court is permitted to consider
the questions of guilt and transfer simltaneously 14 If California were
151. In reJ, 17 Cal. App. 3d 704,95 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1971).
152. The President's Crime Commission Report supranote 48, recommended:
Juvenile court hearings should be divided into an adjudicatory hearing and
a dispositional one, and the evidence admissible at the adjudicatory hearing
should be so linuted that findings are nor dependent upon or unduly nfluenced by hearsay, gossip, rumor, and other unreliable types of information.
To nmmize the danger that adjudication will be affected by inappropriate considerations, social investigation reports should not be made known
to the judge in advance of adjudication.
153. A A.. CoDD nt. 13, §364 (1958); WVA. CODE ANN. S49-5-14 (1966).
154. CAL.WEaL. & INs-rNs CODE §707 (West Supp. 1972) provides:
At any tune during a hearing upon a pennon alleging that a mmor is,
by reason of violation of any criminal statute or ordinance, [within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court], when substantial evidence has been
.,- adduced to support a finding that the minor was 16 years of age or older
at the tune of the alleged commission of such offense and that-the minor
would not be amenable to the care, treatment and training program avail
the court may make a
able through the facilities of the juvenile court,
finding noted mnthe minutes of the court that the minor is not a fit and
proper subject to be dealt with under this chapter, and the court shall
. to prosecute the person under the applidirect the district attorney
cable criminal statute or ordinance and thereafter dismiss the pennon.
(emphasis supplied).

..
InPeople v. McFarland, 17 Cal. App. 3d 807, 95 Cal; Rptr. 369 (1971), and People v.
Brown, 13. Cal. App. 3d 876, 91 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1970), cert. demed, 404 US. 835 (1971),
the California Court of Appeals upheld the procedure' of determifiung the merits of a
delinquency petition and the issue of waiver at one hearing.
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genuinely concerned with the possibility that character evidence might
influence the deternmation of guilt, it would require that any waiver
hearing be conducted after an adjudication of delinquency But even that
-procedure is not necessary in order to eliminate the possibility of prejudice. Many of those states which require that any waiver hearing be
conducted prior to the hearing on the merits have reached a balance
which protects both the child's interest in avoiding two hearings on the
merits and his interest in avoiding any prejudice which might occur
through the judge's study of the child's social record prior to a determination of the merits of the delinquency petition. In those states,
if the juvenile court decides at the waiver hearing not to transfer the
case to the criminal courts, upon objection by the child, the judge who
presided at the waiver hearing is automatically disqualified from hearing
the case on its merits. 15 5 Since this approach protects both of the child's
interests, it is highly preferable to a procedure which protects only his
interest in an adjudicatory hearing free from prejudice.
In considering the effect of a constitutional right on the juvenile court
system, the Supreme Court has also been concerned about whether tb.p
.right would introduce. delay into the system. In the great majority of
cases, prohibiting transfer to the crimal courts once the adjudicatory
hearing begins would not cause any added delay, since only the timing
of the waiver hearing is affected. Only in those borderline cases where
the juvenile court retained jurisdiction after it had conducted a waiver
hearing would there be some additional delay. However, if the goal of
the juvenile court is to attempt to rehabilitate only those children who
are amenable to treatment through the juvenile court's facilities and
to transfer to the criminal courts those children who are not amenable
to such treatment or who pose a threat to the community, the added
assurance that the juvenile court is the correct tribunal to handle the
case should outweigh any slight delay that might arise in a small minority
of cases because of the waiver hearing.
The remaining substantive benefits of the juvenile court system would
not be affected at all by application of the guarantee against double
jeopardy to delinquency proceedings in the present context. The informality of the adjudicatory hearing would remain, regardless of when
the waiver hearing took place. Similarly, the distinctive procedures em.ployed prior to the adjudicatory hearing, such as the stationhouse adjust155. D.C. Code §16-2307(g)

(Supp. V 1972);

GA. Com

ANN. §24A-2501(e)

(1971);

N.M. STAT. AoNx. S13-14-27(i) (Supp. 1972); ND. CENT. CODE 527-20-34(5) (Supp. 1971);
TN.
Co,, ANN. §37-234(e) (Supp. 1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. S14-115.38 (Supp. 1971).
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ment, would still be available to the juvenile court authorities. It is only
after the decision is made to proceed with the complaint against the
child that the double jeopardy protection would be relevant. The juvenile court could continue to process and treat those children who are
likely to benefit from the facilities available to the juvenile court. Applicanon of the double jeopardy provision to juvenile court proceedings
would also have no effect on the policy of avoiding the label of "crinunal", nor would it require the imposition of civil disabilities on children
found to be delinquent. And finally, the states could continue to maintam the confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings and records.
It is also noteworthy that all of the model acts dealing with the juvenile court system require that any decision to waive jurisdiction be
made prior to the taking of evidence at an adjudicatory hearing. The
Uniform Juvenile Court Act, which was the model for the statutes in
many of the 11 states requiring that any waiver hearing precede a
hearing on the merits, protects a child from the ordeal of defending
himself for the same offense in two separate tribunals and from any
prejudice which might result from the juvenile court judge's examnation of the child's social record prior to a determination of guilt.15 The
Standard Juvenile Court Act and the Standard Family Court Act, which
are silent as to when waiver can occur,157 must be read in conjunction
with the Model Rules for Juvenile Courts, 58 a guideline published by
the same agency that formulated the two Standard Acts. Rule 9 of the
Model Rules provides that any waiver hearing be conducted "before
the commencement of the adjudicatory hearing." i59 The comments to
that rule state: "Once the adjudicatory hearing begins, the child is in
fact 'in jeopardy,' and to transfer him to criminal court for another trial
on the facts alleged in the petition would constitute a deprivation of
due process of law " "'

The Children's Bureau's Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and
Juvenile Court Acts is equally emphatic as to when jeopardy attaches.
156. UN FoRM JuvENmE CouRT Acr, supra note 59, at §34.

The Georgia, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wyoming juvenile
court acts are based on the UxwovaR JUvENmE CouRT Act.
157. STANDAR JuvENIE CoURTr Acr, supra note 49, at 513, and STANDAR FAMIy COURT
Acr, supra note 49, at §13, merely provide that waiver is permitted "if the court after full
mvestigation and a hearing deems it contrary to the best interest of the child or the
public to retain jurisdiction."
158. MoDar. RuLts Foi JuvENnE CouRs, supra note 125, at Rule 9.
159.1Id.
'160. Id. at comment to Rule 9.
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In one section it states that a criminal prosecution for the same offense
or'an offense based on the same conduct is prohibited. once the juvenile
court has begun taking evidence -onthe merits of a delinquency petition
or once the juvenile court has accepted a child's plea of guilty; 1 ' and,
in another section, it states that waiver of jurisdiction is permitted only
162
prior to a hearing oiffthe merits of a petition.

'A negative factor-that must be considered on the question whether the
guarantee against double jeopardy is applicable to juvenile proceedings
in the present context is the conclusion reached by the majority of courts
which have considered the issue since Gault. All five appellate cases in
which the i'sue was directly raised concluded that the double jeopardy
provision does not prohibit waiver of-jurisdiction by the juvenile court
after the adjudicatory hearing has begun.6 3 In addition, one court has
discussed the issue in dictum and stated that no jeopardy attaches at
the adjudicatory hearing;' 64 two other courts have held that under the
juvenile court statutes of their states, a finding of delinquency is required
before the juvenile court can waive jurisdiction. 6 5 Neither of the latter
two courts hinted that the required procedure created any double jeopardy problems. No appellate decisions have held that waiver of jurisdiction is prohibited by the guarantee. against double jeopardy once a
hearing on the merits of a delinquency petition begins, although one
court has barred such waiver on statutory grounds. 66
The significance of these decisions must, however, be tempered by
the fact that one-fourth of the states which permit the juvenile court
to transfer a case to the criminal courts prohibit by statute a transfer
161. SH amAN, supra note 59, at §27.
162. Id. at §31(a).
163. People-v. McFarland, 17 Cal. App. 3d 807, 95 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1971); In re J, 17
Cal. App. 3d 70, 95 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1971); People v. Brown, 13 Cal. App. 3d 876, 91
Cal. Rptr. 904 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 835 (1971); Carter v. Murphy, 465 S.W.2d
28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); In re WAutungton, 17 Ohio App. 2d 164, 245 NE.2d 364
(1969) (finding of probable au6 -hat 'child cominutted the unlawful acts charged is
'-enough for court to waive jbrisdiction).
164. In re Mack, 22 Ohuo App. 2d 201, 260 N.E.2d 619 (1970).
165. Seagroves v. State, 279 Ala. 621, 189 So. 2d 137 (1966); In re Jackson, 21 Ohio St.
2d 215, 257 N.E2d 74 (1970).
It should be noted, however, that the Ohio court stated that a finding of delinquency
for waiver purposes could-be made- on a lesser standard of proof ihan would be required in an adjudicatory hearing. In those cases where only probable cause to believe
the child committed the delinquent.acts was shown, no double jeopardy problems would
seem to arise.

166. State v. Halverson, 192 N.W.2-765(IoWa 1971)...
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after the start of the adjudicatory hearing. 1 7 In these states the clear
language of the statutes eliminates any need for court action to protect
the double jeopardy rights of a juvenile. It is also significant that the
eight courts which have permitted transfer after the start of an adjudicatory hearing represent only four separate jurisdictions; of these four
jurisdictions, one has recently amended its juvenile court act to require
that any waiver hearing must take place prior to a hearing on the merits
of the delinquency petition.""
The conflict among the factors considered relevant by the Supreme
Court makes the question whether the guarantee against double jeopardy
prohibits the juvenile court from waiving jurisdiction after the taking
of evidence at a hearing on the merits of a delinquency petition the most
difficult to answer of any of the questions involving the applicability of
the protection against double jeopardy to juvenile court proceedings.
Unlike the application of the protection in the context of a second
delinquency petition for the same acts or in the context of a criminal
prosecution for the same acts for which the child has already been found
delinquent and committed to a state institution, application of the
guarantee in the present context would, in the small minority of cases
where the child's unamenability to treatment by the juvenile court or
the interests of the community in a criminal prosecution do not come
to light until sometime during the adjudicatory hearing, run counter
to some of the aims of the juvenile court system. A value judgment must
therefore be made as to whether all children accused of committing delinquent acts should be denied the guarantee against double jeopardy
so that the juvenile court is never required to handle the case of a child
who might be handled more properly by the criminal courts, or whether
the double jeopardy interests of all children should be protected even
though the juvenile court might sometimes have to proceed against a
child who is not amenable to treatment through the facilities of the
juvenile court.
In making this judgment it must be remembered that if the guarantee
against double jeopardy is held applicable, the juvenile court still will
be able to conduct a waiver hearing in every case where it deems it

necessary, thereby providing the juvenile court judge with the oppor-tumty to make a thorough examination of the child's social history before determining whether to proceed with the delinquency hearing.
The number of cases which pass this screenig process and which re167. See note 134 ,supra and accompanying text.
168. Oino Rnv. CoDE A x. S2151.6 (Page Supp. 1971).

1972]

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

main in the juvenile court when they actually should be transferred-to
criminal court will indeed be small. Because of this fact, it is submitted
that all juveniles accused of committmng unlawful acts should be protected against double jeopardy even if it means that a few childrei who
carinot'be treated by the juvenile court and who pass the initial screen-'
ing process of a waiver hearing are also protected from a criminal prosecution for the same acts. Support for this position can be gathered from
provisions of all of the model'acts dealing with juvenile courts and from
the fact that one-fourth of the states which permit waiver of jurisdicnon, including most of those which have recently reformulated their
juvenile c6urt acts, do not permit waiver after the taking of evidence
at an adjudicatory hearing. Even though courts of several states have
reached the opposite conclusion, the clear trend of juvenile court experts, as evidenced by the recently-formulated Uniform Juvenile Court
Act and the many states which have adopted the provisions of that act,
is toward the requirement that any waiver hearing take place before the
hearing on the merits of a delinquency petition has begun.
CONCLUSION

During the past several years, the Supreme Court has vastly expanded
the rights of juveniles by granting them many of the same constitutional
rights -accorded adult defendants in criminal trials. One question which
the Court has not yet answered is whether the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy is applicable to juvenile court proceedings.
An analysis of the issue, using the framework fashioned by the Supreme
Court in Gault, Winsbzp, and McKeiver, leads to the conclusion that
fundamental fairness requires that the guarantee against double jeopardy
be available to juveniles in order to bar a second delinquency petition
against a child based on the same acts which have previously been the
subject of one delinquency proceeding. Similarly, .subsequent criminal
prosecution for the same acts which have previously served as a basis
for an adjudicatory hearing in the juvenile courts should be barred, and
waiver of jurisdiction to the regular criminal courts after the taking of
evidence at a hearing on the merits of a delinquency petition should not
be permitted.

